NUCLEAR DETECTION


right that any of the original initiatives taken in the wake of 9/11 should be regularly checked to see if they are still providing an eff ective response.


First port of call One of these initiatives – programmes to screen containers at major US ports for the presence of nuclear material – was the subject of a report released in February 2013 by the US Department of


Containers at Shanghai, China. The sheer scale of movement of goods illustrates the problem of illicit nuclear material detection at major ports.


©Hamburg SUD


Containers at Cartagena, Colombia. ©Hamburg SUD


Homeland Security (DHS). Today, radiation monitors operate at 22 ports where 99% of its trade enters and leaves the country. Some 444 monitors are deployed to screen containers as they are taken off vessels. The haulage trucks loaded with containers drive through the portals at 8 km/h (5 mph). In the UK similar systems exist as a result of the £100-million Cyclamen Project funded by the Home Offi ce. In the US, investment in the radiation


portals cost the Federal Government $623 million from 2002 to 2011. During that time 2.8 million alarms were generated by the equipment. By contrast, in the UK, 949 nuclear events have been logged since 1958. Many of these have arisen from accidents involving the transportation of nuclear material. Considering that over 0.5 million pieces of nuclear material are transported each year to, from, and within the UK this is a remarkably small number. At the British ferry port of Dover a


number of high-profi le false alarms have been reported, such as the detection of people receiving radiotherapy. With no


54 CBNW 2013/02


public record of any device being detected to date, it would seem that the greatest value of the portals is that they are highly visible and act as a deterrent to anyone trying to smuggle nuclear material into the UK. That deterrent eff ect can, however, erode over a period of time.


Improving the system The DHS report reveals some shortcomings of current operations. Operations of the monitors were seen not to be adequately supervised. Statistics on the operations of the detectors were not gathered to allow their utilization to be correctly monitored. Some of the portals had not been used for years as local changes were made in traffi c fl ows in ports. Over time the capability provided by the original suite of sensors can atrophy if measures to ensure their effi cient use are not adopted. The report recommended some simple steps to be taken to overcome the


Radiation portals at a US Customs entry point.


problems unearthed by the audit of current use. The US Customs and Border Patrol, who are responsible for the use of the detectors, have agreed to implement all the measures suggested by the DHS. So for now, a potential gap in the multi-layered approach to security will shortly be corrected and at least the potential for Tom Clancy’s fertile imagination to cross the bridge from fi ction into fact may have been averted. But to ensure it never becomes reality all agencies involved will have to remain vigilant. Terrorists aſt er all only have to be lucky once. ❚❙


Dr Dave Sloggett has 40 years’ experience in intelligence analysis, counterterrorism and CBRN and is a regular contributor to CBNW.


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