EDITORIAL
TRIPPING THE WIRE C
hemical weapons in Syria. Bombings and lockdown in Boston. Fertiliser plant explosion in Texas. Nuclear threats from
North Korea. Ricin sent to the President. Where to begin? The rapidly changing nightmare
that is the Syrian Civil War yielded up conflicting reports of both government forces and opposition groups having used chemical weapons. In March Syria’s government and rebels accused each other of an attack near Aleppo by a Scud carrying chemical agents, first reported by Reuters and exposing the continuing need for independent verification. On 13 April The Times published a report saying that unnamed defence sources had “conclusive proof” that “some kind of chemical weapon” had been fired at the village of Khan al-Assal, killing 15 – allegedly based on analysis of a soil sample smuggled out of the country in a secret British operation and taken to be analysed at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down, and on widely aired video footage of victims apparently suffering from the effects of a chemical agent, later claimed by US intelligence services to indicate “limited use” of sarin nerve agent. More reports will likely emerge as the war rages on – and, as with all sporadic and limited CBRN events, will be difficult to verify; the OPCW has no legal right to conduct inspections, as Syria is not a signatory to the CWC and has as of early May refused access by chemical teams. Maximum caution to avoid a repeat of the Iraq WMD intelligence debacle is accompanying arguments already raging about why suspected use of a chemical weapon is any worse a ‘war crime’ than the Syrian government’s conventional aerial bombing of thousands of civilians. Whoever used what, and when, civilians and responders bear the brunt of such attacks and there is little in place to protect them; Israel – long used to such threats - has been making contingency plans for handling a potential CW attack from Hezbollah or other groups which may gain access to Syria’s CW. Likewise the troops and inspection teams that could be sent in on the ground in any intervention could be at great risk.
CBRN re-emerges as the wildcard in conflicts The world’s attention was also once again turned to the
Far East region’s perennial ‘noisy neighbour’ – North Korea. Assessing its true NBC capabilities continued to challenge official observers. In April the US Defence Intelligence Agency assessed “with moderate confidence” that the North could fire a nuclear-armed missile, though with “low reliability” and the assessment was widely challenged. Added to which the North Koreans announced the re-opening of the Yongbyon plutonium processing plant aſter a public display of mothballing it in 2007. Even if their renewed provocative belligerence is merely ramped-up propaganda to boost its new leader, this is small comfort to its regional neighbours, who worry that a local attack could be easily triggered in the current uneasy climate. The US 23rd Chemical Battalion arrived in South Korea in early April - but the South Koreans fear that the US will decrease the number of troops taking part in joint exercises: the impact of sequestration on military operations is, according to US Forces Korea, “undetermined.” The tragic bombings of the Boston marathon in April was
the worst terrorist attack on US soil since 9/11, and prompted a WMD-style lockdown response – city workers were told to stay at home or in the workplace, businesses and schools and universities were closed, and the National Guard CSTs (Civil Support Teams) were heavily involved in response to the incidents. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the surviving alleged perpetrator of the Boston Marathon bombings, has been charged with “unlawfully using and conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction.” This has opened up questions about whether an IED can be a WMD and if the application of WMD to the pressure cooker IEDs could unduly exaggerate their terror effect on the public – while diminishing the massive effect of ‘true’ WMDs. Only two days later letters laced with ricin addressed to
President Obama as well as a U.S. senator and a state judge were intercepted and in a matter of days, a suspect, Paul Kevin Curtis was charged - only to be released and a further suspect, Everett Dutschke, who had issues with the first suspect, subsequently charged with “knowingly developing, producing, stockpiling, transferring, acquiring, retaining and possessing a biological agent, toxin and delivery system, for use as a weapon.” Lab tests found traces of ricin on several items FBI agents had seized from trash at or near Dutschke’s home in Tupelo – as well as publications on his computer describing ricin handling, storage and detection methods, and evidence of his having ordered 50 red castor bean seeds on – you’ve guessed it - eBay. And the day aſter the first ricin arrest, a Texan fertiliser plant with a yearly capacity of 2,400 tons of potentially explosive ammonium nitrate caught fire and blew up, killing 15 and injuring more than 160. If proved to be arson, and specifically jihadi-inspired arson, our article on page 24 relates specifically to this growing menace. The red line into CBRN territory may already have been crossed, but the trip wires are not always visible – or the threat verifiable as ‘true’ CBRN. Regardless of definition – and budget cuts aside - wherever and whenever it happens, we still have to be ready. zy
CBNW 2013/02 05
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