CBRN IN THEATRE
with the IAEA as a bargaining chip” to allay the eff ects from economic sanctions. But Iran is unlikely to be off ered a “get-out-of-jail-free” amnesty for past nuclear-related transgressions. While continuing parallel discussions with six major governments in 2012, Tehran has to date been able to continue its pursuit of a nuclear arms capacity unhindered.
North Korea: even further ahead? On 12 February North Korea went a further step towards a real nuclear capability when it carried out is third test at the Punggye-ri site. First estimated as having a yield of 6-7 kilotons (kt) – but suspected of being smaller than its second, 2009 test of around 5 kt – test results will reveal from radionuclide emissions leaked into the air from the
Buried chemical warfare materiel.
blast if plutonium or North Korea’s smaller stock of HEU (highly enriched uranium) were used. If plutonium, miniaturisation may have been achieved – which would bring the pariah Stalinist state closer to weaponizing its growing medium-range arsenal of No Dong missiles. If HEU, it will prove that the DPRK’s nascent HEU programme has progressed and that the uranium is at least 80% enriched. But further tests would still be needed to prove that a plutonium or HEU device could be successfully weaponized. This is more possible if the DPRK acquired HEU-based bomb designs from the notorious A Q Khan network which sold nuclear technology to several ‘states of concern’ during the 1990s.
Chemical brothers And as with its ongoing Syrian connection, North Korea continues to align with Iran. A leading Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi is believed to have been in attendance for the February test and is reportedly responsible for helping to develop a warhead for the Iranians to fi t onto their ballistic missiles. Iranians were also said to have been present during the DPRK’s long-range missile test in December 2012. Such cooperation between the two nations is borne out by Iran’s Shabah 3 missile having been based on North Korea’s No Dong 1. And the connections don’t end there. The DPRK’s contacts with Iran, which stretch through then to Venezuela via Hezbollah and HAMAS, pose the potential of North Korea getting even further US attention through establishing networks there. What goes around comes around. ❚❙
©US Army Chemical Materials Activity
Dismantling CW is a highly hazardous operation. Iraqi 122-mm artillery rockets dismantled by the OPCW were mechanically damaged and leaked sarin payload; repeat drainage was necessary to remove liquid agent, then solid residues in the munitions.
©Wikipedia Commons
Leſt : Iran’s heavy water (deuterium oxide) IR-40 plant at Arak – a possible future producer of plutonium, but claimed by the Iranians to be for medical radioisotopes.
©OPCW ©US Army
Below: US 789th EOD Company preparing for the destruction of legacy munitions found in weapons caches in southern Iraq. Whole rocket systems, explosives, detonators and chemicals come from Iran to Shiite groups.
A chemical operations crew from the Umatilla Chemical Depot separate a
rocket motor and warhead sections on an M55 rocket in the US CW stockpile.
©US Army/Staff Sgt. Brien Vorhees
42 CBNW 2013/02
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100