CBRN IN THEATRE I
n all, nation-state CBRN advances in recent months and the risk of proliferation of legacy weapons from growing instability in the Middle East are increasing threats
to regional and international stability. Amidst the rapidly changing situation in Syria a mixed picture prevails. The growing use of vehicle-borne IEDs and suicide bombings reportedly by several opposition groups and/or government forces and the number of groups involved – Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda with unclear aims regarding CBRN acquisition – makes the scene ever more confusing and the availability of legacy CW to them harder to track. As a possessor of CW and a non-signatory to the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) Syria poses the most serious CW threat since the first Gulf War in 1991.
Syria descends This all occurs against a backdrop of growing anarchy caused by foreign- backed terrorist groups and mercenaries with connections with the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, which are trying to create – and enhance – a pretext for foreign intervention in Syria and overthrow al-Assad. The situation is increasingly murky: at end 2012 leaked documents stated that Qatar suggested smuggling leſtover CW from Libya to Homs to frame the Syrian Army along with plans for a western-backed military invasion of Iran. A plethora of reports from Israel, Turkey and others in January and February claimed rebels have seized chemical weapons facilities. According to the James Martin Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, Syria’s CW stocks include an estimated hundreds of tons of VX and sarin nerve agent and mustard agent stored in 50 production facilities. Based on satellite imagery, the al-Safir military facility near Aleppo is a prime CW storage site with 16 storage bunkers. Of equal importance is their reputed inventory of 300- and 500-km- range Scud missiles, plus shorter-range but more accurate SS-21 missiles. Chemical attack by government forces
is viewed as most likely to occur as a last gasp – the sting of the dying wasp – before the regime falls – the so-called ‘red line’ which, if crossed, will possibly invite US intervention. Readily transported chemically armed artillery shells would be the easiest to divert and could be used by Hezbollah or another group possessing standard artillery pieces, but groups would have to weaponize the stocks if
38 CBNW 2013/02
THE RED between CBRN and
The dividing line between use of conventional weapons and
anything remotely resembling CBRN is getting thinner. Andy Oppenheimer reviews
nonconventional weapons use in the fog of war
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