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RESPONSE FORCED ENTRY


Dusty Kitzmiller sizes up the dangers in launching tactical assault on industrial facilities


In the past two decades, tactical responses have changed due to the evolving threats of terrorism, clandestine drug labs, use of chlorine and other improvised chemical devices (ICDs), increased hostage taking, and mass killings. While training programmes have evolved to deal with these threats, there are still many units that are not properly trained or equipped.


D


uring January 2012 two major incidents occurred, which although very diff erent, in combination they point to the desperate need to better


equip and better train our Operational and Tactical level leaders and units. These two incidents included the taking of hostages by Islamic terrorists at the remote BP joint-operated gas plant at In Amenas, Algeria, and the explosion at the headquarters of Mexico’s national oil company, PEMEX. The fi rst of these led to an armed incursion executed by the Algerian military killing many of the hostage takers, possibly killing some of the hostages, and led to the detonation of a bomb aimed at and succeeding in the killing of multiple hostages inside the gas plant.


The second incident in Mexico was


originally suspected to be the product of possible sabotage or anti-government terrorism, which was ultimately determined to be caused by a long recurring gas leak over time, with the


66 CBNW 2013/02


gas building up in a tunnel under the plant – and fi nally detonated by the use of improvised and unsafe lighting fi xtures by maintenance personnel.


Sizing up chemical hazards While both of these incidents were caused by very diff erent mechanisms – one most defi nitely intentional, the other accidental – some very basic lessons for tactical entry teams, whether military or law enforcement, should be learned. First – any time a team is ordered


to enter an industrial plant, especially when known or suspected chemicals are used, produced, or stored there, additional Size-Up and Planning factors must be taken into account. During the Size-Up, Assessment,


or Intelligence gathering phase of the incident, all potential, known and suspected chemical hazards must be assessed for their potential for health eff ects, their physical and chemical characteristics, and certainly, their potential to ignite. By understanding the basic physical and chemical characteris-


tics it should be determined where those chemicals, if released or leaking, will likely migrate – and where they will potentially collect, leading to a dangerous concentration. Along with this basic information, the


proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) needed to protect responders from exposure to those chemicals needs to be identifi ed, the unit trained to use it if it is not part of its regularly used equipment, and donned. Decontamination capabilities, even if only at the emergency level, must also be established prior to entry. Another part of the Size-Up is identifying what lines, tanks, and areas through which the chemicals are likely fl owing or being stored. This leads to eff ective planning and briefi ng. All this information, such as the


proper PPE to be worn, locations and procedures for decontamination, and the locations and descriptions of hazard areas to avoid must be briefed. Tactical teams should also consider the employment of environmental monitoring capabilities, which many


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