COUNTRY ANALYSIS intervention, which was backed by states surrounding Mali.
Africa and CBRN proliferation AQIM’s subsequent rapid withdrawal from strategic cities in North Mali demonstrates that their military capabilities are not yet enough sophisticated to challenge regular trained armies. As of today, conventional weapons are deployed and adapted to their objectives. AQIM and its affiliated groups will likely retaliate, though not necessarily against French Special Forces. Will – and can – they use CBRN weapons to retaliate? How can Africa prepare for this threat? African states are not interested in developing CBRN
weapons. South Africa gave up its programme with the end of apartheid. The exceptions are Egypt, which developed chemical weapons (CW) as a response to Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal, Libya’s CW, and Sudan, which finally accepted the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) aſter a cruise missile attack by US forces in August 1998 on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory, which was suspected of producing VX nerve agent for al-Qaeda. The Treaty of Pelindaba (signed in 1996 and ratified in 2009)
established Africa as a ‘nuclear weapons-free zone’. Most African states are signatories and most have also ratified the CWC. But Libya’s General Qaddafi kept secret some of his CW arsenal, including stocks of mustard blister agent, despite his international obligations. The Nation Transitional Council of Libya notified inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, who visited the country in January 2012. However, since jihadist organizations are believed to have taken possession of some of Qaddafi’s heavy weapons arsenal, it is possible that they stole some of his CW stockpile as well.
Poor biosafety As for biological weapons (BW), most African states have shown no interest in signing up to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Indeed, most states continue to focus on addressing the vast problems of public health, and on research against deadly pathogens such as anthrax and the Ebola virus – which still claim a great number of victims on the continent. The main problem which may enhance the threat of BW
For the Western world, the prospect of a
growing ‘green curtain’ of jihadi interests in Africa is currently threefold:
1 2
A safe haven closer to Europe heightening the threat of terrorist attacks
Economic crisis – for example, the French civilian nuclear programme is highly dependent on Nigeria’s uranium – and greater security risks for energy facilities located in Africa, as recently illustrated by the January 2013 hostage crisis in Algeria
3
Increase of internal conflicts in Africa
use in the future is the serious lack of biosafety practices and inadequate health standards in African laboratories. For instance, the African Biosafety Association (AfBSA) revealed that most laboratory staff members in Cameroon stored food, beverages and biological agents in the same refrigerators. Ergo, biological agents could be easy for a terrorist organization to acquire, provided they apply the requisite expertise to their dissemination. Radiological materials used in laboratories and energy facilities are also a vulnerable target. The threat of CBRN proliferation in Africa is therefore most likely to be from terrorist organizations.
Preparedness: whose priority? The CBRN Centres of Excellence, an initiative of the European Union, has been tasked to provide African countries with methodologies and concepts for the setting up of national CBRN teams as well as mitigating CBRN risk, CBRN assessments, and regional cooperation. From the United States, US AFRICOM (US Africa Command) – whose mission includes deterring CBRN proliferation – assists several countries in assessing pandemic preparedness and establishing response plans against natural and man-made disasters. They perform joint exercises and drills and train medical units and military forces such as the Kenya Defence Forces, to assist civilian authorities during response to a HAZMAT or CBRN event. However, African states still, understandably, prioritize preparedness against natural disasters and disease outbreaks, which continue to be a far greater threat to their populations than CBRN proliferation. Arguably, even if terrorist organizations acquire CBRN capabilities, it is not viewed as likely they will target Africa with them as disease and conventional terrorism already accounts for numerous victims. The continent will, however, likely be used as a platform for CBRN trafficking. And if a state, region, infrastructure or laboratory comes under the control of jihadists, these groups may acquire CBRN weapons as a result. Furthermore, if al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups decided
Photo courtesy of US AFRICOM
Hazmat decontamination training in Uganda is the result of activities conducted by US AFRICOM’s Disaster Preparedness Program with the Government of Uganda. The HAZMAT Technician Training is being conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Consequence Management Assistance Program and as a part of the unit’s civil support mission for emergency preparedness and response.
to use CBRN weapons, they could be directed against foreigners working in energy facilities or factories. Therefore it is essential that security teams of foreign companies increase awareness about this threat and bring in effective preparedness plans. Meanwhile, an increasing priority will be improving preparedness and public health and educating medical workers and the population at large against a possible CBRN attack. Increasing military cooperation with Western countries may also help allay the progress of the jihadist threat in Africa. zy
Samantha Rubinsztejn is a Key Account Manager in the Information Technology Field with a M.A. in Non Proliferation and International Security from King’s College London and a B.A. in Counter-Terrorism & Homeland Security from the Interdisciplinary Center of Herzliya, Israel.
34 CBNW 2013/02
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