RESPONSE 9/11 AND HAZMAT


Responders, some without respiratory protection equipment of any kind, stand atop a rubber pile.


RESPONSE Robert L. Domenici discusses lessons learned from Ground Zero T 16 CBNW 2013/02


he 9/11 attacks may seem like a long time ago to some, but the 2nd WMD-CST team was still relatively new then. During the 1990s, several Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) defined the federal response to acts of terrorism involving


nuclear, biological, or chemical materials and weapons of mass destruction (NBC/WMD). Across the United States, special Army and Air National Guard units were trained to deter and detect NBC/WMD attacks – and to respond to them.


WMD-CST Units


The mission of each WMD-CST team is to support local and state authorities at domestic NBC incident sites. When my unit answered the call on 9/11, we learned that many of our civilian counterparts – trained and trusted individuals whom we had known for several years – were dead. As military men and women, we could not let the psychological impact of these losses impede our mission. When we arrived in Manhattan from our base in upstate New York, the 2nd WMD CST had to be ready. To support our civilian counterparts, my unit was responsible


for detecting and identifying WMD/NBC substances, assessing immediate and projected consequences, advising state and local authorities about response measures, and answering calls for additional military support. Our task was complicated by the


loss of communications equipment at the World Trade Center (WTC) itself. For a time, the Mayor of New York City, Rudy Giuliani, could not be reached. A federal agency even asked us for communication assistance.


Training and equipment


Military training teaches soldiers to follow the chain of command, so the 2nd WMD CST identified who was next in-charge on the ground. Some of the civilian responders we teamed with hadn’t been adequately trained or equipped (at least for an event like this), and their commanders had not managed major incidents. Operationally, civilian authorities had to reconstitute their chain of command on-the-spot while continuing operations. Command and control (C2) faced more than just confusion and communication failure, however. Two other ‘Cs’ – cars and confined


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