CBRN IN THEATRE
are calling for a plan for international support to control Syria’s CW post-conflict. However, this may not be at all clear-cut; Syria’s future government may regard possession of a CW arsenal as a continuation of a deterrent to Israel. But much will depend on the nature of that future government – and if it regards relinquishment of all forms of CBRN weaponry as gaining inroads into acceptance by the international community.
The TTP’s TTPs In September reports emerged of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission enhancing security around a nuclear weapons complex near Dera Ghazi Khan, deemed to be at a “serious” risk of attack by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Apart from uranium extraction and milling operations, D G Khan is a uranium hexaflouride (UF6) conversion plant. Response has included deploying a heavily armed military unit to back up existing defences at the facility, and at the boundary with Balochistan, which is heavily populated by insurgents. The alarm was raised in response to phone conversations intercepted by the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), purportedly outlining insurgent plans to send into the facility up to four vehicles carrying Taliban operatives armed with explosives. Alerts have increased since an attack in August by the
Pakistani Taliban on Minhas air force base in Punjab province, believed to house nuclear weapons. It took several hours for Pakistani authorities to suppress the attackers, who had prior intel of the layout of the base, which had been attacked in 2007 (when a suicide bomber hit a bus near the entrance), 2008 (militants fired rockets into the base), and 2009 (suicide bomber on a bike detonated his device on an approach road). Pakistan is estimated as possessing 90-110 warheads, but exact details of their locations are not openly available. Former Pakistani army Brig. Gen. Mahmood Shah in an interview in the Washington Post said that “No nuclear arsenals are being kept in the known places, such as the air or naval bases or military [containment] areas.”
Insurgent attacks During the U.S.-led campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan levels of terrorism intensified and have continued during and aſter drawdown and withdrawal. These included attacks on occupation forces, civilian government and non-government targets, and sectarian violence. Terrorist attacks using chemical weapons, while relatively unsophisticated, are a continuing and disturbing trend in Islamist terrorist TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures). Total identified attacks in Iraq include 16 from 2004 to 2007 in which 115 were killed and 856 injured. In Afghanistan, 39 attacks from 2008 to 2012 have killed two and injured 2,074 (not all cases are confirmed). An attempt to use old Iraqi chemical
weapons in IEDs in May 2004 in Baghdad involved an artillery shell containing binary sarin agents – an unsophisticated effort which caused minor injury from release of the CWA. Of greater concern were 15 widely reported attacks in Iraq from October 2006 to June 2007 using chlorine tanks in car or truck bombs. In many cases more casualties resulted from the bomb
38 CBNW 2013/01
itself than from the chlorine release, but several attacks did result in significant numbers of injuries (mostly minor) resulting from chlorine exposure. Total casualties in these attacks were 115 killed (mostly from the explosions) and 854 injured (a large fraction from chlorine exposure). A series of acid and organophosphate attacks have been
launched mainly on schoolgirls in Afghanistan. Three reported attacks using a form of acid killed 2 and injured 19. Most attacks are non-fatal but mutilating, including against family or acquaintances, and are a growing problem elsewhere in Asia, such as in Pakistan. There were 16 poison attacks in Takhar province, Afghanistan, from April 2012 to July 2012 on girls’ schools. Several cases involved poisoning of the school’s water supply. A total of 1,355 children and 28 teachers and staff were injured in these attacks. In June Afghan authorities made arrests in the cases, implicating the Taliban as well as international terrorists. As many as 20 poison gas attacks on girls’ schools occurred in Afghanistan from April 2009 to August 2010, which involved the release of pesticide-type chemicals and attributed to the Taliban opposing the education of girls. While no fatalities resulted, at least 636 children and 36 teachers and staff were injured, some severely.
Attributing CBRN However, the World Health Organization has claimed that the cases are the result of mass hysteria, with no confirmation of the presence of a poison. This illustrates the problem of proving a CBRN attack has taken place either in military arenas or on civilian populations, and of attributing its origin and perpetrators. In war-torn areas attacks occur in the fog of conflict and the accuracy of reports made to journalists, researchers and inspection teams depends on accounts from witnesses, victims and health workers dealing with them. Intelligence gleaned from local activists may not be reliable
– so much research, evidence gathering from accounts and forensics is vital to ascertain the validity of a CBRN attack. Attributing a biological attack is the most difficult due to the similarity of symptoms to naturally occurring infectious diseases. The chaos of hospital emergency admissions makes it difficult to collate information and once the victims are treated and discharged, or die without full post-mortem, the evidence of CBRN effects may have gone. zy
Workers inspect chemical weapons stored at the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky.
Photo: U.S. Army
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80