CBRN TERRORISM
Andy Oppenheimer tracks elusive terrorist CBRN threats
terrorism
shipments in other containers. Cooperation and exchange of information and intelligence is
vital to prevent proliferation of CBRN materials that could be used in terrorist acts. In May, a Moldovan court convicted three illegal traffi ckers, part of a fi ve-member group that were attempting exchange of a cylinder containing refi ned uranium for cash. The case involved intelligence services from the US, Germany and Ukraine. Georgia’s government last year claimed it had broken up several
smuggling syndicates. But the IAEA fi gures – some 2,200 attempts to steal or smuggle uranium since 1995 – only include detected incidents, and do not include misplaced items as the authorities concerned oſt en did not know they had misplaced radioactive material, or did not want to admit to an international agency they had lost it.
Pre-emption – just in time Many terrorist plots are being nipped in the bud. A noted example, in June 2012, saw Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, a Saudi national and former chemical engineering student at Texas Tech University, convicted of planning to bomb nuclear facilities in the US. While his aims had not begun to reach fulfi lment, Aldawsari’s personal notebook stated he had been plotting a strike years before enrolling as a student in October 2008. Offi cials said they found various IED components, including wiring, clocks, and chemicals, as well as lab equipment and protective clothing. Aldawasari had studied nuclear power facilities, 12 reservoir dams, and the Dallas home of former President George W. Bush as possible targets, and had tried to produce TNP (trinitrophenol), an explosive chemical with a similar blast yield to TNT. Federal bomb specialists said the amount of chemicals Aldawsari had amassed would have produced
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Nuclear security training provided by the IAEA, which runs 60 events annually.
IAEA inspectors monitor the removal of close to 40kg HEU from a research reactor in Poland before it is airliſt ed back to Russia – two bombs’ worth – another critical step in enhancing the security of fi ssile material by eliminating stockpiles of HEU.
Some 2,164 incidents have been confi rmed to the Illicit Traffi cking Database (ITDB) since 1995.
Between 2002-2011, IAEA Nuclear Security Teams visited 95 relevant sites, nearly 200 sites with other radioactive material and 120 border crossings.
Equipping front line offi cers to detect radiation. More than 3,200 detectors have been provided by the IAEA to 57 States.
Photos: ©IAEA
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