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CBRN TERRORISM


almost 7 kg (15 lb) of explosives, equivalent to that used in each of the IEDs set off by suicide bombers in the July 2005 London attacks. His student tuition fees were being paid by an unidentifi ed Saudi industrial company.


Above: Terrorists will fi nd and exploit the weakest link in any security system.


Below: Radioactive materials must be adequately controlled and protected. The IAEA has secured over 6 000 radioactive sources in 35 States.


Photos: ©IAEA


Are terrorists still aiming for CBRN? From around 2009 a prevailing opinion is that the CBRN terrorist threat of a mass casualty incident is decreasing partly since the weakening of AQ Central, and that many AQ-affi liated and other groups lack the capabilities, facilities, and organisation to launch more complex attacks and are sticking to what they know will attain instant impact, death and injury – bombs, bullets, rockets and other conventional forms of attack. This includes the viewpoint that AQ and other jihadi groups may now think they have more to lose by launching mass casualty attacks; that CBRN weapons are too unpredictable in producing this desired outcome; and may be too dangerous and diffi cult to deploy. Improvised CBR could be used by smaller extremist groups with AQ links – or by lone wolves. But their operational limits may make this less likely than predicted in the heat of the immediate post-9/11 years. But this is just one line of thought. Assessing terrorist acquisi- tion of CBRN weapons and capabilities in applying them will continue to require constant vigilance depending on intelligence and other sources of reliable information. Tracking these capabili- ties may be like spotting subatomic particles whizzing round the Large Hadron Collider – we have to make sure they show up and that we can capture them. ❚❙


“BOLD MOVES ARE NEEDED”


According to the US National Research Council (NRC) in a study report released in September, “the US simply cannot aff ord to deal with all threats on an individual basis, and there is no universal solution – it has to choose which problems to solve.” The NRC panel reviewed the Chemical and Biological Defense Program run by the Department of Defense (DoD), which includes several defence agencies, to determine CBRN defence capabilities and the role of military and civilian agencies in bolstering them. The panel concluded that the US cannot aff ord to develop


defences to all of possible CBRN threats, that almost all of the DoD’s core science and technology needs for CBRN defence already exist outside of the military, and that bridging the gap requires a culture change. Of arguably greater concern is its conclusion that there is a


“poor understanding” of the intentions of America’s adversar- ies for using CBRN, and an even lesser understanding on how the US can stop its adversaries from using these weapons. The NRC pointed out the number of offi ces and agencies


involved, and said that the US military needed to look for breakthroughs and promote ‘blue-sky thinking’ to partner better with private sector R & D, fi nding that “almost all of the capabilities can be found outside of the (military) service laboratories.” It decided that the commercial capabilities of defence or pharmaceutical industries exceeded those of the military, such as in developing chemical or biological detectors, concluding: “Bold moves are needed to break the current stagnation that permeates the chemical and biological science and technology and acquisition environment. Tweaking the management or refocusing a few projects will not be suffi cient.”


18 CBNW 2013/01


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