COUNTRY ANALYSIS
Determining if a state is involved in a covert nuclear programme can be difficult. Dr Dave Sloggett suggests how a more rigorous framework of analysis may help provide indicators of trends that should be of concern.
STATE Not so
SOLID A 24 CBNW 2013/01
nyone who has followed the press coverage of Iran’s alleged attempts to obtain nuclear weapons will understand one simple point. When it comes to really understanding what Iran is up to, sorting the wheat from the chaff can be very difficult. Media
coverage rarely approaches such topics objectively. Headlines forecasting Armageddon hardly provide a scientific basis for analysis. Rigour is the first victim of the headline. At present there are around 50 states in the United Nations
actively considering embarking upon nuclear power pro- grammes. Despite the terrible scenes at Fukushima and the memories of Chernobyl many countries find themselves in the position where nuclear power offers solutions to increasing energy demands that other sources of sustainable energy simply do not provide. Some also take the view that if they are ever to have a chance of meeting their global emissions targets for carbon dioxide reductions, there is simply no other alternative. Others are driven by a need to diversify their reliance on existing energy suppliers. Belarus is one country that is finally embarking on the development of two nuclear reactors for just such a reason.
From power to weapons The difficulty is that once states embark upon such a pathway they could go further and start to develop a covert nuclear weapons programme. North Korea’s approach to this is now regarded as an example that other countries could choose to copy. Its slow build-up of nuclear stocks allowed it to assemble enough material to build seven nuclear weapons. While the two that have been detonated to date can barely be described as nuclear events, the international community’s reaction has been telling. North Korea now commands the one thing it always wanted, respect. Syria’s efforts to become a nuclear
power by building a covert programme with the help of the North Koreans shows how proliferation can become a major international security issue. The Syrian
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