This page contains a Flash digital edition of a book.
CBRN IN THEATRE


Aiming at civilians


A US Army Stryker fi ghting vehicle lies on its side aſt er surviving a buried IED blast in Iraq in 2007. In the past three years since troop withdrawal, however, civilians have been the mainvictims of sectarian terrorist attacks. Photo courtesy of C-52 of 3/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team


Andy Oppenheimer takes his customary Cooks tour of CBRN threats in theatre – and their eff ects on civilians


I


n late October reports emerged of the al-Assad regime attempting to gain access to large amounts of precursor materials – rubbing alcohol and methylphosphonyl difl uoride (DF) – primary ingredients needed to produce sarin. The CIA and regional governments are said to have


pre-empted several attempted purchases by individuals with ties to Damascus, including an eff ort to purchase phosphorous compounds that can be utilised to produce DF. If the reports can be verifi ed, they open up valid suspicion that Syria’s reputed stocks are past their shelf life, according to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. An estimated 500 metric tons of sarin precursors are stored at as many as 25 separate facilities – and have to be combined to become deployable as real CW. The attempts by Syria to gain the means to manufacture fresh sarin stocks highlight the problem of preventing countries


36 CBNW 2013/01


from evading international sanctions in order to create CBRN weapons. According to the Australia Group, a voluntary group of countries which tries to harmonise export controls to prevent CBW proliferation, Syria has used “extensive tactics, including the use of front companies in third countries to obscure its eff orts to obtain (regulated equipment), as well as other dual-use items, for proliferation purposes.” Iran, North Korea and Libya had also used the same methods over more than ten years to build up its nuclear programme, having benefi ted from technologies and materials proliferated on their behalf by the notorious transcontinental network of front companies and agents managed by Dr A Q Khan, Pakistan’s ‘father of the bomb’.


Syrian stocks going AWOL But the threat of CW use by either government forces on Syrian rebel groups – and civilians – has not receded. During the


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80