CBRN IN THEATRE
‹‹ A SCUD missile launcher is seen during US Army training exercises in 1997. Security analysts worry that Syria’s stockpile could fall into the wrong hands as confl ict in the country continues.
US Dept. of Defense
summer the government said it would only use its CW arsenal in the event of foreign intervention or attack. The rebel groups are becoming more varied and complex by the day, and increasingly include jihadi elements. Many believe al-Assad could still carry out aerial attacks, in the manner of Saddam on Halabja in 1988, if his regime appears about to fall. Regime security around the stockpiles is said to be holding but could be weakened as the Civil War intensifi es and presents more opportunities for the many non-state actors involved in the confl ict to acquire the stocks and arguably the delivery vehicles to launch them, which include 300- and 500-km-range Scud missiles and shorter-range, but more accurate SS-21 missiles. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) may have greater diffi culty
maintaining eff ective and constant stewardship of hundreds of easily pilfered and concealed MANPADS, land mines and transportable chemically-armed artillery shells. These present opportunities of diversion by Hezbollah and other groups possessing standard artillery rockets of the kind found in the Syrian arsenal. Even a small number of chemical munitions in the hands of Hezbollah (or al-Qaeda, now operating in Syria) could worsen the threat to Israel and further destabilise
the region. Little is known about Syria’s biological weapons capability,
and although it has not restored its alleged eff orts to develop nuclear weapons and fi ssile material since the reactor near al-Kibar was bombed by Israel in September 2007, some sites are suspected of having equipment or facilities that could be relevant to their production. The Syrian government has refused to permit international inspectors to visit three sites suspected of being part of its nuclear programme, which if they were taken over by the FSA, they should be pressed to authorise such inspections; however, this is by no means guaranteed.
Gaining control CW storage and production facilities have been built outside major population centres mainly to enhance secrecy and safety, but as insurgents take over more areas these may fall within their territory – including airfi elds and sites storing missiles. Syria has reportedly moved some of the CW to more secure locations, but some large stocks of bulk agent that may be diffi cult to relocate may be leſt in situ and be purloined. Therefore, many non-proliferation institutes and offi cials
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