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CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT


The year 2012 the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) celebrated the 15-year anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Back then, the Organisation began a long-awaited quest – to rid the world of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).


F


rom poison darts to the Spartans’ use of arsenic smoke in the Peloponnesian war of 431-404 BC and Greek fi re – a deadly mix of petroleum, pitch sulphur and resins – in 637 AD, to World War I and further development throughout the 20th century, chemical


weapons (CW) were the fi rst example of using scientifi c knowledge to make a WMD. Chemical warfare agents (CWAs) were designed with specifi c


purposes in mind to incapacitate, maim and disable and they continued to be used during post-World War I confl icts – in Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia (1935-1936) and Japan’s war with China (1937-1945). Unimaginable numbers of CW and large- scale delivery systems were manufactured during World War II but were fortunately never used. However, Egypt used CW in North Yemen (1963-1967) and more notably, and thanks to intensive media coverage, they were extensively deployed in the Iran-Iraq War (1983-1988).


Eliminating WMD The CWC seeks to ensure all CW stockpiles – and the facilities in which they were produced – are destroyed, that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only used for purposes that are not prohibited, that all member states have access to assistance and protection and to international cooperation, and fi nally, to promote the peaceful use of chemistry. The CWC is the fi rst multilaterally negotiated and verifi able


treaty banning an entire category of WMD. It is also one of the most widely endorsed disarmament treaties ever. Fiſt een years on and with 188 member states, 75.37% of the 71,196 metric tonnes of chemical agent that has been declared – and verifi ed – across the world has been destroyed, along with 45.65% of 8.67 million chemical munitions and containers. The term ‘Chemical Weapon’ is applied to any toxic chemical, or its precursor, that can cause death, injury, incapacitation or sensory irritation through its chemical action. The munitions or delivery devices designed and produced to deliver the chemicals are also considered to be chemical weapons. The implementation of the Convention would be simple if


these toxic chemicals were only ever used for the production of weapons. However, the complexity of the Convention arises from the fact that some toxic chemicals and their precursors are widely used for peaceful purposes in industry across the globe. Therefore, monitoring and verifi cation of their peaceful uses is provided for in the Convention.


Libya and Syria The importance of eliminating the world’s stockpile of CW has been highlighted recently with the crises in Libya and Syria. Libya has been a member state to the CWC since January 2004 and its former government made its declaration which the OPCW verifi ed with its process of on-site inspections. The stock of unfi lled munitions was destroyed and production facilities demolished, leaving the stockpile of sulphur mustard. Destruction of the sulphur mustard began in 2010 and nearly


55% had been neutralised when, due to an equipment malfunc- tion, the process was interrupted. Around the same time the protests against the government began – and the repairs to the destruction facility were not possible. Following the UN recogni- tion of a new government in Libya, the obligation to complete


the destruction falls to them and consultations are under way to return the OPCW inspectors and recommence operations. With Syria it is a diff erent story. Syria is not a member state


of the Convention – therefore it has no obligation to declare any possession of CW or production facilities and the OPCW has no legal mandate to conduct inspections in that country. The country is in the midst of a civil war. To date, the presence of chemical weapons has not been confi rmed; however, it has ratifi ed the 1925 Geneva Protocol renouncing the use of chemical weapons against any state. So, the CWC has provision for investigating the alleged use of CW involving a State, not Party, to the Convention – where the OPCW would cooperate with the UN Secretary General and make its resources available on request.


Facing multiple risks The work of the OPCW continues against the production, re-emergence or use of CW but will always face challenges. Old and abandoned (produced before 1946) chemical weapons will continue to emerge, and anything buried before 1977 is not declarable. Of course there is also the unimaginable numbers that may have been dumped at sea to consider, and these will continue to wash up on the shores and will have to be dealt with. Chemical safety and security is a global concern. Chemical-


related incidents are not unique to specifi cally manufactured CWAs – they can result from deliberate and accidental releases of chemicals created for peaceful uses, which although hazard- ous to health, have justifi ed uses in everyday life. Toxic chemicals are created as by-products of reaction processes and fertilisers and pesticides are vital for food production. The eff ective functioning of our world demands an increasing dependency on chemicals which in turn brings with it a necessity for preparedness for when an incident occurs. The Convention allows for the use of toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes that are not prohibited, but which will still be subject to verifi cation by inspection. However, as technology and the need for chemicals in everyday life continues to grow, so does the risk of a chemical release from accidents, including transit incidents and natural disasters.


Joining the CWC By joining the Convention a State Party agrees to renounce any CW option, and in return has the right to request assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of them. Capacity building has always been an important task of the OPCW, both in developing and maintaining its own readiness to respond to a request for assistance – and in assisting State Parties to develop and improve their own preparedness in country. In most countries, a National Protection Programme comprises military and emergency services fi rst responders,


together with specialised equipment and requisite skills. Regional, National and International training courses are off ered by the OPCW every year, which cover all aspects of incident prevention and response preparedness. These courses are attended by First Responders, National Authorities, Customs Authorities and Laboratory Personnel and are an essential element in building the confi dence that States Parties see as a key pay-off for joining the Convention in the fi rst place. 


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