CBRN TERRORISM
The quantum of Q
uantifying the terrorist threat is getting harder, and the CBRN threat harder still. Beginning with the perennial ultimate ‘bad guys’, al-Qaeda: since
the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and a series of elimination strikes on other leaders and operatives, mainly by unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), the once strong organization has been weakened. But it continues to pose a serious international threat as it has become more dissipated and thence, more diffi cult to trace and predict. Apart from the continuing worry that
self-starter groups will continue to focus on economic targets – transportation hubs, commercial aviation facilities, energy production centres – the upheav- als in the Middle East and North Africa are set to provide a further breeding ground for AQ and other jihadi groups. This volatile situation may enhance
the possibility of their acquiring CBRNE weapons from the black market, weapons caches shipped out of Libya, or stockpiles now being pilfered in Syria – including chemicals and delivery munitions – from either the Syrian government or from one of the many burgeoning rebel groups. The availability of legacy weapons has
16 CBNW 2013/01
increased since the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings in 2011. Ground to air and anti-tank missiles have exited Libya to jihadists in the Gaza Strip and possibly to Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram elements in the Sahara region. In February 43 SA-24 antiaircraſt missiles and a shoulder-launched SAM-7 were found in a cache in In Amenas, southern Algeria, near the Libyan border.
Radiological weapons: evading detection The threat of terrorists using radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) is one of the most nebulous to assess, as use or attempted use of these weapons have not been reported other than in rare instances, mainly by Chechen rebels in the 1990s. Tracing attempts to deploy RDDs or possibly an improvised nuclear device (IND) oſt en starts with arrests of terrorists in the throes of stealing, buying or smuggling radioactive materials. Sometimes arrests are made as a result of ‘sting’ operations. In October, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
claimed that eff orts by terrorists to build a RDD were becoming “more professional”. According to Yukiya Amano of the IAEA, smuggling networks had hold of technology to evade radiation monitors. She told The Telegraph: “Terrorists having access to nuclear material is a real threat. They have developed a particular container to put highly enriched uranium (HEU) in as samples. The groups repeat deliveries to defeat the preventive measures. This is a real threat.” The worrying aspect is the ability to get HEU in containers
past detectors. Lead-lined boxes have been used to transport uranium for scientifi c purposes for many years but they may be adapted by smugglers. Additional searches would uncover the shipment, and intelligence may alert authorities to further
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80