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NORTH KOREA


A detailed look at North Korea’s decision making does reveal some logic behind its chosen route into building nuclear weapons. They are not the only state in the world regarded with some disdain by the wider international community. For a state to become a nuclear power there are lots of indicators that no doubt intelligence agencies are monitoring. Where a state has natural resources, such as uranium, this can be an important building block. Sudden developments or investments in a state’s science and technology base can also provide indicators. Cooperation with other governments can also provide clues.


ZIMBABWE


Zimbabwe’s eff ort to cooperate on nuclear matters with Iran is one example. It is a country with a dire energy situation. Zimbabwe has limited supplies of uranium but lacks the know-how to make progress on building a civilian nuclear power generation capability. Recently Harare has refocused its eff orts on China aſt er relations with Tehran became strained.


BELARUS


Belarus is a country that for some time has publicly debated developing its own nuclear power stations. The legacy of Chernobyl was keenly felt in Belarus. Its national capability to deal with civilian nuclear emergencies is highly regarded. But as a country it desperately needs to reduce its dependence on Russian gas supplies. Belarus is an example of a state that could go either


way. Sanctions imposed by the international community over its faltering steps on the road to democracy could drive the government in Minsk to develop a covert nuclear programme. To date, the signs are that this is not happening. If anything, the government has gone out of its way to reassure the IAEA that it is not actively engaged in any such planning.


graphical analysis methods are crucial. This approach off ers a potential way forward. For Iran, however, when the proposed framework as its stands is populated with information derived from open sources, all the indicators are red arrows. It would seem that international concerns over the Iranian


nuclear programme have some basis in fact. While the fi nal jigsaw puzzle built from covert sources may still have gaps, its combination - with a rigorous analysis of open-source material - does at least allow some detailed analysis to be conducted. ❚❙


Dr Dave Sloggett has 40 years’ experience in intelligence analysis, counterterrorism and CBRN.


www.ibcevents.com CBNW 2013/01 27


NCT COUNTRY ANALYSIS on onventional hreat CBRNe Israel


4-6 June 2013 - Israel Trade Fair & Convention Center in Tel Aviv, Israel


The Non-Conventional Threat (NCT) is coming to Israel! Asia’s number one CBRNe and C-IED event is joining the Israeli Defence Exhibition (ISDEF) for the first international CBRNe and C-IED Conference and Exhibition. Situated in a high conflict region, Israel is threatened by the use of CBRNe agents and IEDs from both state actors and terrorist organizations. Preparing against this threat is of crucial importance.


Following in the footsteps of our highly successful NCT: CBRNe Asia 2012 and NCT: C-IED India 2012 events, NCT: CBRNe Israel 2013, will bring together experts, end users, policy makers, industry and procurement staff.


Conference Topics will include: Medical Countermeasures, and Public Health, Bio Terrorism, Detect, Decon and PPE, Non-proliferation, Counter IED and PPE, EOD, Security of Urban Environments and Critical Infrastructure and Border Security.


n 2 days of Conference • n The first international CBRNe and C-IED conference and exhibition to take place in Israel


n Focus on the Israeli approach to CBRNe and Counter IED defense


n Meet senior Israeli procurement staff n Listen to CBRN First Responders from Israel and the USA, IDF CBRN Special Forces, Israeli and US Government Officials, US Army, UN and many more


n Announcing the nominees for the NCT CBRNe Innovation Awards


n Join Asia’s #1 CBRNe Conference in Israel!


Early bird


discount: book before March 1st 2013 and


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