A8 THE LONGEST WAR Nawa’s return to stability could be model for U.S. nawa from A1 “Nawa is not like the rest of Afghani-
stan,” saiddistrict governorAbdulManaf. “It is a great success becausemany things have happened here that have not hap- pened inother places.” The ratio of troops, bothAmerican and
Afghan, to the population is higher than in most places. The Afghan army battal- ion that is partnered with the Marine battalion here has greater experience than many other units in the area. And unlike the vast majority of districts, the contingentsofAfghansoldiersandpolice- menare at full strength. On the civilian side, Nawa is blessed
with a farmore harmonious relationship amongits tribes thanmostotherdistricts; Manaf is regarded by U.S. and Afghan officialsasanunusuallycompetentgover- nor;
andtheU.S.Agency for International Development has poured inmoremoney here, per capita, for reconstruction and short-term employment projects than any other part of the country. Many civilian officials who track the
war at theWhiteHouse, the StateDepart- ment and the CIA remain unconvinced that other parts of Afghanistan will turn around as quickly as Nawa has. They argue that weak local governance, tribal rivalries, inept development projects and incompetent Afghan security forces re- mainthenorm. Petraeus disagrees. He contends that
many of the positive developments in Nawa — improved security, governance and development — can be replicated in the country’s other insurgent-controlled districts. But for those conducting the White
House review, a central question is whether this place actually proves that counterinsurgency strategy can work acrossAfghanistanandendaconflict that has become the longest war in American history. “It’s either a roadmap for the future, or
an alignment of the stars, the likes of which we’re unlikely to see anywhere else,” said a senior administration official who is participating inthe review.
Why Nawamatters ThestoryofNawaisonlyonechapter in
a narrative of progress Petraeus is pre- senting to claimthat the United States is finally starting to win a war that it had wonbut thenstarted to lose. He points to major security improve-
ments inandaroundKandahar, the coun- try’s second-largest city,because of opera- tions conducted by newly arrived U.S. soldiers.He notes that secretmissions by Special Operations Forces over the past six months have resulted in the death or capture of hundreds ofmid-level Taliban leaders, resulting in growing demoraliza- tion among insurgent commanders. And he expresses optimism about a new 20,000-manvillage defense programthat is expanding law enforcement into areas the police donot patrol. Despite the incipient signs of progress,
Afghanistanstill remainsaviolent, chaot- ic nationwith asmany signs of American defeat as of victory. There were, on aver- age, more than 75 insurgent attacks on U.S.,NATOorAfghanforceseverydaythis summer—aratesignificantlyhigher than last year. Assassinations of government officialsandpeopleworkingwithinterna- tional troops and development firms are analmost-daily occurrence. Late last year, the NATO command
decidedtoconcentrateitseffortsonsever- al dozen “key terrain” districts. Not only have most of those places not improved, but Taliban activity, once concentrated in the south and east, has metastasized to northern and western parts of the coun- try.
Military commanders express confi-
dence that their counterinsurgency strat- egy, coupled with the additional troops authorized by Obama, will eventually turn the tide. But they acknowledge that their efforts could come to naught if Pakistan does not eliminate sanctuaries for Afghan Taliban on its side of the border, and if President Hamid Karzai’s governmentdoesnot seize theopportuni- ty affordedby improvedsecurity inplaces suchasKandahar to improve civil admin- istration by cracking down on corruption and appointing more qualified people to official posts. Thus far, there is little sign of progress oneither front. One possible solutionmay be a power-
sharing deal between the Afghan govern- ment and the Taliban. Although recent attempts to kick off a dialogue faltered afterAfghanofficialsdiscoveredthat they had been meeting with an imposter, not withthe group’s secondincommand,U.S. officials still hold out hope for a peace settlement. If it happens, however, it could rile Afghans who are not ethnic Pashtuns — about half the country con- sists of ethnic Tajiks,Uzbeks andHazaras — and possibly plunge the nation into another civilwar. That is why Nawa becomes so impor-
tant. If Afghanistan is to achieve a sem- blance of stability without a negotiated end to the conflict,more districts need to look like this one. What has occurred in Nawa over the past 17months highlights what needs to break America’s way in order towinthewar.
Continued lawlessness The Taliban didn’t put up much of a
fight. PHOTOS BY ANDREA BRUCE FOR THE WASHINGTON POST
The process of shapingNawa into one of Afghanistan’s safest districts began in July 2009, when a 1,000-member battalion
ofU.S.Marines landed to help protect the civilian population. Since then,U.S. and British advisers have helped build the local government and put millions of dollars into funding reconstruction projects.
EZ SU
KLMNO
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2010
Merchants at the bazaar are busy, and schools are packed.“Many things have happened here that have not happened in other places,” the district governor said.
WhentheMarinesarrivedinJuly2009,
most of the insurgents who lorded over thedistrict fledtotheneighboringdistrict of Marja. Others buried their weapons and blended back into the community. Very few decided to challenge the Ma- rines, and those who did usually wound up dead. The Marines also got lucky with the
Afghan army. The battalion sent to Nawa had been part of a national drug-eradica- tion force. They did not have extensive military training, but the soldiers had worked together for more than a year, yielding a degree of cohesion that few other units sent to southern Afghanistan had. After months of joint operations with
the Marines, the Afghans have been deemed capable enough to take charge of five small patrol bases—the first step ina gradual process of transition to full Af- ghan control over the district. The next phase, which could occur as early as the spring,would involvemovingmost of the Marines here to bases in the surrounding desert, where they would be available to provide emergency backup for Afghan soldiers and to interdict insurgents seek- ing to enter the area. The police are far more ragged. Until
just a few months ago, this district of 75,000 people had two rival chiefs: One controlled the northern half; the other had the south. Both men have been re- moved and replaced with a new com-
mander, but most officers still remain loyal to their old bosses. In the southern village of Pinjadoo, the
police “have no loyalty” to the new com- mander, said Lt. Brad Franko,who serves as amentor to the
force.Most of them, he said, are related to the previous chief, Ahmed Shah, who “is like the Godfather here.” The area is quiet, Franko said, because
Shah’s men have struck a deal with the Taliban to conduct their operations else- where. “The Taliban don’t come here to messwith these guys, and in return these guysdon’tmesswiththeTaliban,”he said. The town of Nawa—home to the base
from which Marines on foot patrol have not fired a bullet in five months — has seen almost no insurgent activity this year, but criminal behavior has been growing, prompting concern among some U.S. and Afghan officials because the Taliban has successfully pitched itself in the past as an antidote to lawlessness. More than half of the new solar-powered streetlights installed by USAID are not workingbecausetheirbatterieshavebeen stolen. Even more worrisome was the night-
time robbery of the district’s largestmon- ey changer. His shop is directly across fromthe police station, andmany people here believe the culprits were officers loyal to the former northern chief. But there isno conclusive evidence. “I trusted the Marines when they said
AMarine keeps watch as people make their way to the Friday market. Plans are for Afghan forces to take over chief responsibility for security in the spring.
theywouldbringsecurity,”saidthemoney changer, Abdul Sattar. “ButNawa doesn’t feel secure.” The situation ismore problematic out-
side themain town. The Talibanmay not behere inlargenumbersorwiththe same arsenal of roadside bombs as in other places,but theyhavemanagedtosowfear with a flurry of nighttimewarning letters and a few well-aimed bullets. One recent victimwas the training coordinator for a USAID-funded agriculture project who was assassinated as he prayed in his neighborhoodmosque. “TheMarines feel safe,but theordinary
people in Nawa do not,” said Khawanin, the headmaster of themain school in the district.He has started varying the routes he travels fromhishouse to the school. “If the Taliban decide to kill you, there’s nothing the Americans will be able to do about it.” Despite repeatedMarine operations to
flush themout, bands of Taliban fighters remain in the treeless desert between Nawa and Marja. Their ability to roam through themore-populated agricultural areas along the Helmand River remains limited, althoughthey stillhavebeenable to plant roadside bombs and snipe at Marine patrols. “The enemy doeswant to come back,” Petraeus said. U.S. Special Operations Forces have
targetedthebomb-layingcells repeatedly, providing theMarines with three to four weeks of relative calm until a new group moves in and resumes attacks, the offi- cials said. “The SOF guys are getting a lot of them, but they’re regenerating almost as fastaswecankillor capturethem,” said one military officer familiar with the op- erations. Of particular concern to some officers
is that improvements in security are not spreading beyond the farming villages alongtheriver. IntheWhiteHousedebate over the troop surge last fall, seniormili- tary leaders promised that counterinsur- gency operations eventually would en- largeazoneof safetyasblotsof inkspread onamap. “Theinkblot isn’tgrowingbyitself,” the
officer said. “The only reason it’s expand- ing is becausewe’re addingmore ink.”
A friendly governor Unlike most other government build-
TheU.S. military has hired local men to help build a national police station in Nawa. Insurgent action has been minimal, but criminal activity is on the rise.
ings inAfghanistan, there isnoportraitof President Hamid Karzai on the white- washedwalls ofdistrict governorManaf’s office.
“People here don’t likeKarzai.His gov-
ernment is filledwithsnakesandspiders,” said one local leader who spoke on the conditionof anonymitybecausehe feared retribution from the president’s allies. But that attitudemay be a key reasonwhy things areworking sowell inNawa. In 2002, Karzai appointed a five-foot-
tallwarlord,SherMohammedAkhundza- da, as the governor ofHelmand province, which encompasses Nawa district. Ak- hundzada, who hails from a family of wealthy landowners that has long ruled the province, rose to prominence as a commander in the armed resistance to the Soviet occupationinthe 1980s. In an account corroborated by U.S.
intelligence analysts, several residents said his rule, which largely involved con- solidating control overHelmand’s opium production network, was so brutal and corrupt—his sidekickpolice chief ranthe force as a personal militia — that many residents invited the Taliban to return to the province. By 2004,much ofHelmand was under insurgent control. In 2005, the British government insist-
ed that Karzai remove Akhundzada as a condition of deploying NATO forces to Helmand. The president initially object-
ed.Thenninetonsofopiumwerefoundin Akhundzada’s basement. He was sacked, but he remains a close adviser toKarzai. On his way out, the analysts said, he
toldmany of hismilitiamen to join forces with the Taliban to protect his drug inter- ests and drive out theBritish. Akhundzada’s supporters,who include
aides toKarzai,
disputetheU.S.character- ization of his tenure and insist that the province would be safer today if he had beenleft incontrol. After two incompetent replacements,
Karzai eventuallygave the jobofgovernor toGulabMangal,who had run two small- er provinces with distinction. With the help of the British and later theMarines, Mangal set out to improve Helmand’s government by appointing more compe- tent district leaders—Manaf has a phys- ics degree from Kabul University — and focusing on delivering basic services to the population. That has helpedMangal build popular
support.But evenmore significant is that he is regarded bymanyHelmandis as the first leaderwho has beenwilling to stand up to Akhundzada — and, by extension, Karzai, whom people here fault for ap- pointing Akhundzada. In Nawa, there may be no Karzai photo on the wall, but there is a giant poster of Mangal in the hallway leading to the district governor’s
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