After all, Wylie describes two fic-
tional Midwestern cities next to each other, and the combination of Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Mis- souri, would have fit the bill. The impact of nuclear annihilation
and the agony of the survivors (some- thing captured in John Hersey’s 1946 book Hiroshima, a nonfiction account of six survivors of the American bomb- ing of that city) has never left me. It was a significant factor in my
decision in August 1958 to spend my life trying to ensure American safety and freedom. We are in graver danger today of
enduring a nuclear war than at any time in my lifetime. The unpredictable nature of Mr.
Putin’s personality — and the degree to which he may believe he must win or be overthrown — create massive volatility. The extraordinary ineffectiveness
of the Russian military against the courageous Ukrainians and the will- ingness of America and our European allies to support Ukraine add pressure. Finally, the clear superiority of our
weapons over the Russians’ sets the stage for an incredibly difficult choice for the Russian dictator. And given the terrible sacrifices
the Ukrainians have suffered and the viciousness of the Russian attacks, there may be no emotional possibility for a negotiated truce that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy can accept. So long as the West continues to
provide arms, ammunition, and finan- cial aid, the Ukrainians may insist on winning back the whole of their country. Yet if the war continues to grind
on, the Russian people will become increasingly dissatisfied. The number of Russians fleeing the country is a grim indicator of how many do not support Mr. Putin’s war. The current mobilization of
300,000 or more civilians is likely to further increase dissatisfaction. It’s also not likely to have Mr. Putin’s desired effect on the battlefield.
There is no clear Biden Doctrine for how we would respond. That increases the likelihood that Mr. Putin will think it is a reasonable gamble to destroy the Ukrainian forces with a handful of tactical nuclear weapons while threatening to hit Western cities if NATO reacts.
The new draftees will have inad-
equate training, equipment — and conviction. They are likely to do even worse than the soldiers who have already failed. Russian casualties will increase, and Russian defeats may also increase. At that point (it may be a matter
of weeks or months — not years), Mr. Putin may decide that using tactical nuclear weapons while threatening to hit Europe and America with strategic nuclear weapons is a better gamble than continuing to lose. He may also conclude that the Unit-
ed States and NATO will not respond to limited nuclear weapons. Certainly, the Biden administra-
tion has failed to set the stage for nuclear deterrence — having already failed catastrophically in Afghanistan and completely misread the Russian- Ukrainian conflict. Remember that Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said publicly that the Russians would be in Kyiv in three days. As proof of how wrong American intelligence was, the United States offered to fly Mr. Zelenskyy to safety if he agreed the fight was hopeless. History was changed by his cour- age in an almost Churchillian manner.
There is no clear Biden Doctrine for
how we would respond to the Russian use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. That ambiguity (or confusion, which- ever it is) increases the likelihood that Mr. Putin will think it is a reason- able gamble to destroy the Ukrainian forces with a handful of tactical nucle- ar weapons while threatening to hit Western cities if NATO reacts. We may be faced with the choice
of accepting a terrifying precedent: That nuclear-armed powers can use nuclear weapons on their neighbors so long as they threaten to escalate the conflict and endanger European and American cities. In a world in which China, North
Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel, Great Britain, and France already have nuclear weapons — and both Iran and Japan could acquire them quickly — we risk seeing Wylie’s nightmare turned loose on humankind. This is a good time for prayer and
serious, sober thinking to find a path of deterrence that works for Mr. Putin — and all nuclear powers. Failure to do so may have horrify-
ing consequences.
This article first appeared in The Washington Times.
NOVEMBER 2022 | NEWSMAX 11
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