a.
Accident of the container ship EL FARO (US flag) and some consideration of the owner's liability. Following the sinking of the EL FARO in October 2015, reports by the USCG and the National Board, while implicating the Master, reported numerous other shortcomings. NB: The VDR found thanks to very large means, was usable with a 26- hour recording.
The report accuses the ship’s captain of a poor assessment, underestimation of the seriousness of the situation, a lack of precautions to escape the dangerous sector of the hurricane, a poor assessment of the condition of the ship despite the warnings of the shipboard officers. However, the captain was experienced and came from several years of not-so-easy trips off the coast of Alaska.
The shipowner has also been heavily criticized for numerous failures among other things violations on working hours and rest, lack of safety training, lack of maintenance or modernization of facilities (such as this huge flag exemption for open lifeboats for ships built before 1986), with a short stability, lack of internal procedures for cyclonic periods and so on. All this stemmed from the benefits of the grandfather clause.
The ABS class and the USCG were also criticized in this report for the same reasons and particularly, the ACP program - Alternative Compliance Program - typically American, which ultimately allows ships below standards to sail under the U.S. flag. Amazing! The corresponding trial is still being investigated, it will be curious to see if this time the shipowner (US) will be sentenced for negligence, for example! We can dream! (see **).
b.
In parallel, another recent analysis (February 2018) in the former magazine Safety At Sea by the editor-in-chief, Mrs Tania Blake, entitled Finding the blame factor.
We are told that investigations into major accidents such as EL FARO and COSTA CONCORDIA highlight the responsibility of shipping companies “one of the first things that we, as human beings, do in times of disaster is look for the cause and often someone to blame. It is no different in shipping, where in cases of accidents, crews find their decisions examined as to whether they were sensible and measured or hasty and ill informed. While it is right that everyone’s actions are analyzed to discover the root causes and so lessons can be learnt and shared among the industry, crew often take the brunt of blame as they are on the front line of shipping by contrast, shipowners, the individuals, and companies with true power over wider safety practices and culture often go unpunished.” Credit to former Safety at Sea magazine (see ***).
** The EL FARO case came back in spring 2020 with a kind of “Mea Culpa” from the USCG. Interesting, isn't it? ... so, we'll talk about it again. *** The magazine has disappeared since that time - strange, isn’t it?
My God, we're not used to hearing that! … Maybe an evolution is underway?
It is true, in the sharing of responsibilities related to safety of the ship and her operations, it is believed, thanks to the ISM code, that the things are clear:
- The objectives of safety culture and pollution prevention are those of the operating company and not those of the Master.
- It is the company's responsibility to establish, implement and maintain a safety management system created by the company and not by the ship's captain.
- To achieve the objectives, the company must establish a policy and ensure that this policy is applied by all. This is not the Master's safety policy.
- The responsibilities of all staff must be defined. For ships, there is no problem in the merchant navy, we know what to do on board! On the other hand, we rarely find the responsibility of all the shore personnel involved and in particular their responsibilities in the application of the SMS of the company However, since the IMO circulars of 2007 and 2013 we now find the responsibilities of the DPA quite easily without seeing them very detailed. Why?
c.
- NB. Circular MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8 is very clear on this issue. The ideal would be for each function, a text message will be inserted into the job description. IMO circulars would then become more useful!
In partial conclusion, how do companies react after an accident that affects them? In general, companies feel that governments or IMO are not competent and that they need to find the solution themselves. This starts from a good feeling of self-regulation except that our shipowners who hate any new regulations (which for them are only going to increase their costs) will move towards an action - always the cheapest possible. Indeed, in their respective associations it is like a permanent contest - who will find the cheapest solution (LOW-COST syndrome)!
Finally, the existing system that gives all responsibilities on the Master’s shoulders is satisfactory for them. So why change?
However, if at the international level and at IMO, the responsibilities of both ashore as well as on board were well defined and understood, we might not be there. The code was born for this partly - to define the responsibilities of each - in order to assist the bodies involved in national judgments following maritime accidents! Or if the code actually involved the big boss in the event of an accident. We understand better that these same big bosses are standing on the brakes for the application of the ISM code and also that they tend to interpret it to their advantage only.
THE REPORT | DEC 2024 | ISSUE 110 | 99
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