same time, they cause less of an impact. Preventing a low level radiological attack is clearly harder and much more expensive than preventing a high level attack. At some point, the cost of increasing security against a radiological attack becomes disproportionate to the amount of damage to be avoided. In general, effective low cost actions


should always be considered first, especially where there is a high probability of preventing low cost events. Obviously, these factors should also be considered by policymakers when making decisions.


Policy implications and conclusions Terrorist organisations have conducted attacks using WMD agents and are likely to continue doing so in the future15


.


While there is no way to predict the magnitude of such attacks, it is safe to assume that lower level attacks with a smaller economic and societal cost are more likely than higher level (and higher cost) attacks, and they are more difficult, and more expensive, to avert. As we noted above, just as insurers must balance the cost of insurance premiums against the probability and cost of a potential terrorist incident16


should policymakers. They should balance the cost of an interdiction system against the probability and cost of attacks of various magnitudes. Both military and civilian


approaches to cWMD efforts focus on three main objectives: preventing both state and non-state adversaries from obtaining WMD; ensuring that adversaries possessing WMD do not use them; and if they do use them, that their effects are minimised. The US policy on WMD countermeasures has made significant attempts to increase barriers to WMD acquisition and proliferation by both state and non-state actors17


. To


date, vast amount of the government’s budget has been spent on military and nonmilitary cWMD efforts both domestically and abroad. Those who determine the priorities have a responsibility to ensure that this funding is spent as effectively as possible. Hence, we suggest that approaching such policy decisions in a manner similar to that described here may help policymakers to allocate resources effectively while assessing the risks taken. We also note that preventing a WMD attack further spares our nation the cost of retaliating against those who launched the attack and their sponsors. Therefore, the policy


so


recommendations in this paper focus on the imminent threat from terrorist organisations, for which we are continuing to spend on prevention. It is apparent that terrorist groups will stop at nothing to attain the necessary capability and intend to explore various CBRNE and WMD-like capabilities. This is evidenced by current events in Syria,


Iraq, North Korea and Malaysia that clearly indicate that WMD and WMD-like CBRNE weapons are in development and are being used. A failure to properly evaluate and prepare for the likelihood of a CBRNE weapon attack in the homeland carries grave consequences in terms of lives, infrastructure, economic and political legitimacy. The policy recommendations for the


new administration are to critically evaluate the level of preparedness for a WMD attack, cWMD efforts and the associated costs. The president’s 2018 Department of Defense budget proposes the tools necessary to eliminate terrorist groups such as ISIS by disrupting its external operations and striking its targets. The president’s 2018 appropriation calls for a $54bn total increase for national defence20


. It is now


of utmost importance for the new administration to prioritise cWMD efforts within the national defence strategy and to ensure that there is a balance in appropriations invested in these cWMD efforts. It is only then that the government can make informed decisions on national security efforts to protect the citizens of our nation and achieve an effective cWMD enterprise.


Acknowledgement: We would like to thank Brigadier General JB Burton, (Rtd), former commander of the 20th CBRNE command, for providing invaluable input and guidance.


1 US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 18, Section 2332a: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2332a 2 AAA Terrorism Insurance Implementation (C) Working Group:


https://www.actuary.org/files/publications/McCarter_Statement_Terrorism_Insurance_Matters_to_NAIC_0603 29.pdf 3


The Islamic State and WMD: Assessing the Future Threat: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-islamic-state-and-wmd-assessing-the-future-threat 4 Securing the Cities Programme: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=723935


5 Assessing the Bioweapons Threat: http://www.upmchealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubspdfs/2015/Science2015Boddie7923_1.pdf 6 BioPortfolio: http://www.bioportfolio.com/resources/pmarticle/1701944/Expert-Views-on-Biological-ThreatCharacterization-for-the-U-S-


Government-A.html 7


American Academy of Actuaries: http://www.actuary.org/


8 PRNewsWire: https://www.yahoo.com/news/report-risk-experts-highlights-challenges-reform-options-national164300848.html 9 DoD Strategy on CWMD: http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/DoD_Strategy_for_Countering_Weapons_of_Mass_Destruction_dated_June_2014.pdf 10 Department of Homeland Security Safety Act:https://www.safetyact.gov/pages/homepages/Home.doc


11 Property Casualty 360: http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2014/06/05/yes-you-can-model-terrorismrisk?&slreturn=1494121390 12 Rand Corporation: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG388.pdf


13 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-onterrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf 14 University of Alabama Department of Economics Finance: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~mrgarfin/OUP/papers/Enders.pdf 15 DNI James Clapper’s Testimony at US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing:


https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/wwt2016.pdf 16


18


National Association of Insurance Commissioners: http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_events_2013_handout_insurance_acts_terrorism_brunch.pdf 17 US Department of State: https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/21247.htm


OMB Trump FY 2018 Budget: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf?utm_source= CSIS+All&utm_cam paign=9ba2228615-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_06&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_f326fc46b6-9ba2228615-184660721


www.cbrneworld.com CBRNe Convergence, Indianapolis Motor Speedway, Indiana, USA, 6 - 8 Nov 2017 www.cbrneworld.com/convergence2017


June 2017 CBRNe WORLD


53


CBRNeWORLD


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68