Measure for measure


there are some things, no matter how potentially catastrophic, that are simply too improbably for there to be any need for insurance. Flood insurance8


, for


example, is not required for someone living far outside a flood zone, and few will insure themselves against meteor impacts. Other events are so common and so inexpensive that it makes sense to pay out of pocket rather than to insure against them; this is analogous to having an insurance policy with a deductible amount. Between these extremes, the resources invested in insurance depend on a number of factors; primary the magnitude of an event to be protected against and the probability of an occurrence. Generally, these factors are inversely proportional – more severe events tend to happen less frequently than lower impact events. Similarly, it makes sense to take easy, low cost protective measures (eg installing smoke detectors) that can help prevent or mitigate the cost of an event. The US strategy9


on cWMD activities


is: “To reduce incentives to pursue, possess, and employ WMD; to increase the barriers to WMD acquisition, proliferation, and use; to manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, or failed states and safe havens; and to deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats through layered, integrated defenses". Along these lines, we consider cWMD efforts as analogous to an insurance policy taken out by government10


. In this case, we consider


the factors noted above; in particular, the magnitude of the event to be protected against and the probability of an occurrence. We also consider the efficacy of proposed preventative measures as well as the cost. For example, smoke detectors may not prevent a fire but they are a low cost and effective way to reduce its impact. These factors are discussed briefly below. In developing our argument, we


propose that with finite resources available disproportionate spending makes little sense. For example, it is reasonable to spend $100m to try to prevent a large scale radiological attack that might inflict a $100bn cost on society. However, it is not reasonable to spend $100m to keep disgruntled


employees from causing $1,000 of damage by deliberately contaminating an area with a short lived radionuclide. Thus, in order to determine what measures to take to prevent or mitigate the effects of a CBRN or explosives attack, it is essential to determine the potential impact of an attack, the likelihood of such an attack, and the cost of mitigation and recovery. Many methods have been used to


determine the economic costs of the numerous factors surrounding various types of terrorist attacks. Less amenable to economic analysis is the cost of human life11


, although this has been


addressed in both life insurance and economic literature (while acknowledging that many non- monetary factors cannot thus be determined). Some factors cannot be easily calculated, such as the effects of fear on a society following an act of terrorism, and the infringement of civil rights that might result from protective measures.


Magnitude of event to be prevented We define the overall magnitude of any terrorist attack to be a function of the following: 1. Economic cost of property damage and recovery costs. 2. Economic and societal costs of injuries, deaths, disruption and changes to society. 3. Psychological cost to those affected, even if not directly, by an attack. 4. The time required for the city and nation to recover from the attack.


Some of these factors are amenable to quantitative treatment while others are less so. In general, the magnitude of any sort of WMD or CBRNE attack will be proportional to the toxic dose of chemical used, the amount of radioactivity (in curies or becquerels) present, or the virulence of harmful biological agents in the attack.


Probability of an event of a given magnitude12 Small events are virtually always more common than large events, whether naturally occurring or manmade. Accordingly, we can expect that a small


scale WMD attack is more probable than a large scale attack because it is easier to obtain or fabricate small amounts of agent(s), which will be easier to handle and deploy. A prime example is the improvised explosive device (IED). Preparations for employing a small device are harder to detect and to interdict than preparatory actions associated with a larger device (eg a truck bomb). Accordingly, we assume that large scale WMD attacks are less likely than attacks of lesser magnitude.


Efficacy of preventative or mitigation efforts We now move on to the cost and


efficacy of taking action to prevent or mitigate the impact of an attack. It is reasonable to try to prevent terrorist attacks or to attempt to mitigate the consequences, but these measures have varying degrees of efficacy and practicality. For example, IED attacks can be effectively prevented13


by banning


the sale of explosive precursors and instituting surveillance of every person, vehicle, dwelling and container for explosive trace residues. But such draconian measures, while effective, are expensive and impractical. Many substances that can be used to produce explosives have dual purposes (eg certain fertilisers, fuels, cleaning chemicals, etc). In addition, such extensive checks would infringe civil liberties at tremendous social and monetary cost.


Costs of prevention or mitigation Factors affecting the cost of implementing a protective action include the difficulty of taking the action, the equipment needed, and the extent of the measure being taken14


. An


individual radiation detector might cost about $1,000; however, a single radiation detector is unlikely to stop a radiological attack. Thus, a network of detectors will be required, with the cost increasing in proportion to the number of detectors. Likewise, the number of detectors required for interdiction is proportional to the size of the area to be protected. Finally, lower activity sources are harder to detect and require more detectors to assure detection – at the


CBRNe Convergence, Indianapolis Motor Speedway, Indiana, USA, 6 - 8 Nov 2017 www.cbrneworld.com/convergence2017 52 CBRNe WORLD June 2017 www.cbrneworld.com


CBRNeWORLD


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