Dr Dany Shoham, senior researcher at the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies, on the threat from the DPRK's non-conventional technology


GThe North w


lobally, the issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - aka North Korea - is


aggravating in terms of both image and essence. At present it involves, firstly, the US, South Korea, Japan, and China. Secondly, yet meaningfully, Iran, and even Syria, are involved, as will be shown later. While the nuclear and ballistic vectors are currently acute within the worrisome – potentially colossal – North Korean (NK) issue, the additional CW and BW components, which are definitely within the NK arsenal as detailed below, are no less important. The amplitude of the NK potential CBN threat appears to be fairly wide. Within the nuclear domain, it was estimated in 2016 that NK possesses a stock of uranium enriched to military grade that could be sufficient for about six nuclear weapons, plus plutonium for about 16 additional nuclear weapons. The NK ballistic programme


constitutes the principal, though not the only, vehicle - conceptually and technically - for all three WMD programmes, of which CW and BW are already fully mature with confirmed operational offensive capabilities. The conduct of nuclear and ballistic programmes is intensifying and expanding, chiefly with the aim of adding US territory to the area covered by NK’s evolving missile systems. This paradigm came into being long ago. But in June 2017, no other than the head of the US Missile Defense Agency, Vice Admiral James Syring, told a hearing of the US House armed services committee that: “The advancement of and demonstration of technology of ballistic missiles from NK in the last six months have caused great concern to me and others. It is incumbent on us to assume that NK today can range the US with an ICBM carrying a nuclear warhead." Although not all the recently field tested missiles are suitable for nuclear


warheads, some of them are plainly intended for that ultimate purpose,. This chronology would appear to


reflect the rivalry between President Trump, who entered the White House in January 2017, and the NK despot, Kim Jong-un. Yet NK has actually conducted dozens of missile tests since the start of 2106, as well as its fourth and fifth nuclear bomb tests, and procuring its first miniaturised nuclear warhead, small enough to fit on a missile. The motivation behind such a military strategic shift in NK - more than three years after Kim Jong-un took over - could certainly be completely domestic. Nonetheless, should an extraneous factor be sought, the unique interface between NK and its sole, particularly close ally, Iran, is presumably relevant. Collaboration between the two countries in the ballistic and nuclear domains has been evolving steadily since the 1980s, while the full profile of activities is far from clear. The Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) was implemented in January 2016, having been created in June 2015 and adopted in October 2015, and various nuclear and ballistic activities are prohibited in Iran as a consequence, but not abroad. NK is regarded as ready and able to provide a clandestine means of circumventing the deal, which would allow the Iranians to advance their military nuclear programme covertly in NK. This might possibly underlie the intriguing momentum in NK since the beginning of 2016. At any rate the ongoing NK-Iranian cooperation bears consequential implications. For instance, NK can benefit significantly - and simultaneously - from huge Iranian financial support and from Iran’s technological superiority in respect of developing and manufacturing advanced centrifuges using carbon fibre rotors, on which both countries depend for


uranium enrichment. On the whole, it appears that complementary technology and common approaches mark NK- Iranian interaction in respect of ballistics and nuclear factors, alongside the financial vector. The pertinent ballistic components include both liquid fuelled and solid fuelled missiles. For decades, NK has made extensively ballistic technology transfers to Middle Eastern countries, specifically Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran, whereas currently such cooperation is predominantly with Iran, and to some extent Syria. The CBN dimension is inherently entrenched as regards Iran and Syria. Thus, during the 2000s, the NK-Iranian axis relied on a paramount antecedent that directly led to the clandestine construction and running by NK of the military plutonium-based nuclear reactor in Syria, until it was destroyed in 2007. This exceptional project seems to clearly indicate, the nature, creativity and full extent of this unparalleled axis, which fully included Syria during the 2000s, and still does so today, to some extent, with regard to CW and BW as well. Over many years NK has been


providing technological support for the weaponisation of chemical and biological warfare agents within the context of various delivery systems in Iran and Syria, up to the level of building factories for that purpose. The full scope of those NK activities is mostly covert. As one example, in 2012, NK apparently supplied genetically modified biological warfare agents to Iran and Syria. Obviously, the nature of the NK-Iranian interface is such that it should be meticulously monitored in all CBN contexts; otherwise, extremely undesirable developments might take place, which will not be revealed in real time, if at all. This brings us back to the past 18 months of NK ballistic plus nuclear momentum, which may simply


CBRNe Convergence, Indianapolis Motor Speedway, Indiana, USA, 6 - 8 Nov 2017 www.cbrneworld.com/convergence2017 44 CBRNe WORLD June 2017 www.cbrneworld.com


CBRNeWORLD


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68