The North will rise again


on the day of the assassination, passing through Vladivostok on their way back to Pyongyang. South Korea's request to detain four of the North Korean suspects was rejected by Russian officials on grounds of lack of evidence. Symbolically, at the least, this


political assassination using VX can be regarded as a probe on behalf of NK’s CW capabilities. It gives out signals from the NK regime - whether deliberately or not - about the readiness, usability, and deployability of its stocks of VX for purposes of guerrilla warfare, chemical terrorism or wide-scale chemical warfare. Although the toxin was administrated in an unremarkable manner - compared to two analogous examples performed by the KGB and its successor, the Russian Federation’s Federal Security Service (FSB) when assassinating Markov using ricin and Litvinenko, with plutonium-210 - the willingness and practicality exhibited by NK are notewworthy. Further, it can be assumed that the NK dictator was in the plot from the beginning. He might well have an affinity with chemical and biological warfare agents, being employed for whatever purposes. It so happened, that about three


months after the VX-generated assassination, the NK state news agency KCNA said that a ‘hideous terrorist group’ conspired with the CIA and South Korea's intelligence service. The intent was to commit bomb terrorism targeting the NK supreme leadership by means of a ‘biochemical substance’ during major events including a recent military parade. An extraordinary 1,800- word report on the matter offered no evidence beyond an account described as laced with fantastical language. At any rate, this 'top anti-NK biochemical plot' is now on the record, and will remain there; certainly as far as the NK regime is concerned. Meanwhile, as NK conducted its


series of missile tests, Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe warned, at a parliamentary panel on national security, that NK might already be capable of firing missiles at Japan, tipped with warheads containing sarin nerve agent. It can be assumed that he knew precisely what he was talking


about, and that his worry was genuine, based on sound knowledge. South Korea aside, Japan is indeed threatened by NK, both conventionally and unconventionally. VX and sarin nonetheless constitute


but two of the chemical warfare agents in NK’s vast toxic stockpile. Mustard gas, Lewisite, and phosgene oxime are are also in the NK inventory. The country is presumed to have something between 2,500 and 5,000tonnes of chemical agents. However, assessments indicate that NK‘s CW facilities could produce much more - up to 12,000tonnes of chemical warfare agents a year. South Korean experts estimate that NK has four military bases equipped with chemical weapons, 11 facilities where chemical weapons are produced and stored, and 13 dedicated research and development facilities. The immensity of both NK’s CW


and BW programmes typifies them. The biological inventory is assessed to include highly virulent influenza viruses, smallpox, Korean hemorrhagic fever, yellow fever, anthrax germs, plague, cholera and typhoid. Specific facilities have been identified in respect of influenza and anthrax, with eight installations engaged with influenza viruses. Of these, Institute 398 is the most prominent. The Pyongyang Bio- technical Institute, a factory supposedly for the production of a bioinsecticide is actually producing weaponised anthrax. A variety of missiles, rockets, artillery shells and aerial bombs have been designed to deliver NK’s chemical and biological warfare agents. All in all, NK presents the


international community with a variety of challenges. In particular, the US, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and Nato will inevitably be involved, one way or another, in continual efforts aimed at halting NK’s nuclear and ballistic progress, and bringing about nuclear regression. The prospects are rather uncertain, in view of NK’s technological achievements and weaponry it has already amassed, plus the intrinsic characteristics of Kim Jong-un and his regime. Much less attention is being paid to


NK’s evident, large-scale, offensive capacities in terms of CW and BW, an attitude which might prove highly counterproductive. The VX political assassination can be seen as an alarming hint, if unintentional. Thus, should violent conflict arise with NK, the menace of sub-nuclear WMD is actual, whether or not nuclear confrontation occurs. Its concrete CW and BW faculties and related alignments should be monitored meticulously. Elsewhere, corollary proliferation


issues particularly in reference to Iran and Syria, have to be visited and handled thoroughly. The peculiar coupling of NK and Iran, firstly within the nuclear sphere, and in conjunction with the ballistic sphere, may have shaped the means to circumvent the Iran nuclear deal. Moreover, the very fact that for many years NK could successfully manoeuvre so as to effectively procure tangible offensive WMD capacities may plausibly serve as a model - though not entirely equivalent - for Iran. Besides, Iran’s offensive CW and/or BW capabilities, and perhaps those of Syria as well, are presumably still being upgraded, thanks to contributory inputs coming from NK’s corresponding capabilities. Burma has been added to the nuclear/ballistic complex. A 2010 UN sanctions committee report stated that NK operates an international smuggling network for nuclear and ballistic missile technology, including to Burma, Iran and Syria. Within a violent framework


scenario, a key point is the threshold at which Kim Jong-un would employ WMD. It may certainly vary according to the type of weapons - whether nuclear, chemical or biological - as well as the mode of employment. The NK ruler is unpredictable in that respect. His threshold might be relatively low, and his advisors might not necessarily be decent. Alternatively, a peaceful framework scenario, whereby NK regresses might be achieved only if substantial alterations in monitoring their activities are implemented. The NK issue has to carefully be considered and assessed based on refreshing, innovative approaches.


CBRNe Convergence, Indianapolis Motor Speedway, Indiana, USA, 6 - 8 Nov 2017 www.cbrneworld.com/convergence2017 46 CBRNe WORLD June 2017 www.cbrneworld.com


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