Ghost rider requesting a flyby


inspection team members, particularly in armed conflict zones. It may become feasible to adapt ground penetrating radar technologies (or similar) into networked, low cost, commercial off the shelf (COTs) quadcopters for persistent monitoring, including checking whether a vehicle has passed into a facility (eg, by detecting soil compaction). Such platforms could also be employed to support individuals in the field (eg, for inspector safety and security, including through the use of facial recognition software).15 Civil society may have the capacity


to independently deploy networked UAV platforms to conduct parallel verification monitoring. Such UAVs may become ubiquitous, with implications for how inspection site perimeters are agreed (eg, through the employment of UAV survey data which, in turn, may not match other data), as well as for ensuring authorised inspector movement remains unimpeded during


1


inspections and longer term monitoring. Highly capable autonomous systems may become adaptable within months or days.16


In short, the CWC


member states could, out of an abundance of caution, give further structured consideration to evolving or disruptive S&T developments, so as to better anticipate possible fundamental shifts in CWC implementation practice.


Looking ahead The implementation of a proper and effective framework for ensuring that sensitive information is protected and not inappropriately shared with third parties may constrain European level security and defence capability development. There are inherent contradictions and tensions arising from rights of access and the realities of who is at the core of a given project. The range of political priorities and understandings and differing capacities and levels of engagement among the EU


member states parallel, in some respects, those within the UN system organisations. As such there could be synergies or lessons from multilateral disarmament and arms control treaty regimes (eg, information sharing, technology and equipment evaluation) that have resonance with the EU and vice versa. Notwithstanding such challenges, autonomous and semi- autonomous platform technologies will continue to be developed and applied in ways that are difficult to predict and fully plan for.


*Dr John Hart is a senior researcher and head of the chemical and biological security project within the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) arms control and non-proliferation programme. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of SIPRI.


Lisbon Treaty, Protocol 10, article 2. Direct funding for Nato principally comprises common funding and joint funding. The procedures for calculating national security and defence acquisition are distinct. The 2017 civil budget which covers personnel expenses, operating costs and capital


and programme expenditure of Nato HQ staff totals €234.4m. 2


Politique et de Sécurité’. 3


The PSC discusses and defines EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP) and provides guidance to the EU military committee (EUMD) and the committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM). COPS stands for ‘Comité


European Council, Concept note: operational planning and conduct capabilities for CSDP missions and operations, EU document 6881/17, 6 Mar. 2017. 4 Directorate General for External Policies (Policy Department), Study: the Future of EU Defence Research (European Parliament: 2016), p. 29,


<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/535003/EXPO_STU(2016)535003_EN.pdf>. 5


European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: European Defence Action Plan. EU document COM(2016) 950 final, 30 Nov 2016,


<https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/com_2016_950_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v5_p1_869631.pdf>. 6


<http://ec.europa.eu/budget/news/article_en.cfm?id=201606301350>. 7 <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2016/10/28/first-eu-pilot-project-in-the-field-of-defence-research-sees-grant-


agreements-signed-for-1.4-million>. 8


Rupesh, K M, et al., Wearable flexible and stretchable glove biosensor for on-site detection of organophosphorus chemical threats, ACS Sensors (3 Mar. 2017), <http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1021/acssensors.7b00051>; and Anonymous, ‘Lab-On-A-Glove’ could bring nerve agent detection to


your fingertips, CBRNEcentral.com, 22 Mar. 2017, <https://cbrnecentral.com/lab-glove-bring-nerve-agent-detection-fingertips/10635/>. 9


Linköping, Sweden, 2015), Master of Science thesis in control technology. 10


Reiss, K. [Patten, F], Mission-Adaptable Chemical Sensor (MACS) (US Army Research Office: Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, 27 Mar. 2009). Contract performed by Smart Transitions, LLC (Oakton, Virginia) for US Defense Advanced Programs Agency (Strategic Technologies Office),


Feb. 2016), pp. 36-37 11


unclassified.. 12


Fein, G, DARPA to explore swarming operations, IHS Jane’s International Defence Review, vol. 50 (Mar. 2017), p. 28. 13 Williams, H, Rheinmetall develops multipurpose UGV, Jane’s International Defence Review, vol. 50 (April 2017), p. 25.


14 Chikwanha, I and Pujo, E, New technology for an old disease: unmanned aerial vehicles for tuberculosis sample transport in Papua New Guinea,


<https://www.msf.org.uk/sites/uk/files/1._2_chikwanha_new_operational_models_ocp_sv_final_0.pdf>. 15


As of May 2017 the OPCW had verified the destruction of 24 of the 27 chemical weapon production facilities (CWPFs) declared by Syria. The remaining three, consisting of one aircraft hangar and two above-ground stationary facilities, remain outside Syrian government control. Nakamitsu, I, Briefing to [the] Security Council on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons


programme of the Syrian Arab Republic and update on the activities of the OPCW-UN joint investigative mechanism (JIM), 23 May 2017, New York. 16


The DSB has observed the following timeframes: (a) platforms (20-50+ years), (b) infrastructure (10-25+ years), (c) mobile weapons (5-20+ years), (d) electronics (1-5 years), and (e) IEDs and software (days to months). US DOD, Seven Defense Priorities for the New Administration: Report of the Defense Science Board (DOD: Washington, DC, Dec. 2016), p. 64.


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CBRNe WORLD June 2017 CBRNe Convergence, Indianapolis Motor Speedway, Indiana, USA, 6 - 8 Nov 2017 www.cbrneworld.com/convergence2017


Gottleben, E, Vision based Control of an Autonomous UAV (Linköping University (Dept of Electrical Engineering, Division of Automatic Control): Everts, S and Davenport, M, Drones detect threats such as chemical weapons, volcanic eruptions, Chemical & Engineering News, vol. 94, no. 9 (22


www.cbrneworld.com


CBRNeWORLD


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