SUNDAY, AUGUST 1, 2010
KLMNO Why being wrong can feel so right wrong from B1
own belief in an idea as a sign of that idea’s veracity. We engage in this thinking all the time, about everything: We decide what flavor ice cream is best or what the long-term prospects of the “tea party” are, and we promote these beliefs, often fiercely. Humans are engines of strong, often ill-formed or arbitrary opinion, and any assertion of one’s knowledge carries with it an accusation of others’ errors. We judge others’ mistakes more harsh- ly than our own, often assuming that oth- ers’ errors stem from one of three flaws: idiocy, ignorance or evil. As Schulz writes, “Moral and intellectual wrongness are connected not by mere linguistic coinci- dence but by a long history of associating error with evil — and, conversely, right- ness with righteousness.” “Being Wrong” traverses disciplines
and eras, deftly interweaving etymology (Schulz reminds us that “error” derives from the Latin word for “to stray or wan- der”) with such sources as Saint Augus- tine’s “Confessions,” contemporary neu- roscience and vivid examples of radical mistakes. For instance, to illuminate the resilience of error, she tells the disqui- eting tale of a woman suffering from ano- sognosia, the unawareness or denial of a
disability: The woman remained con- vinced that she could see despite having recently gone totally blind, going so far as to describe in vivid yet absolutely in- correct detail her hospital room. Through such cases, Schulz lays bare the inductive failures, misperceptions and biased assumptions that exist in less extreme form in everyone and that every- one should find instructive. In “Wrong,” Freedman takes a darker
view of our errors, and while his book is less artfully written than Schulz’s, it is more forcefully argued, focusing on the point where error shades into deceit. Why do experts fail? Political pundits and business writers are paid to give opinions, not to be right. And as Freed- man points out, despite life’s complexity, we prefer the simple advice proffered by informal experts, particularly when it re- inforces our preexisting ideas or affirms our hopes (sleep your way to a six-pack!). The startling lesson of “Wrong,” how- ever, is how often medical researchers engage in similar crowd-pleasing charla- tanism. “If,” Freedman writes, “a scientist
ALEX NABAUM
wants to or expects to end up with certain results, he will likely achieve them, often through some form of fudging, whether conscious or not.” He supports this as-
sertion with a torrent of research — ex- perts on experts — hoping to disenthrall readers from the seduction of scientific expertise. He notes this irony and devotes an appendix to explaining why his sourc- es should prove more reliable: “Experts who study other experts’ failings are bet- ter equipped . . . to avoid those troubles.” On balance, Freedman is convincing, even if his explanation sometimes exhib- its a bit of “cuz it’s true.” “Wrong” makes a powerful case for the
prevalence of scientific ineptitude. For example, data are often disregarded if they contradict the results that were pre- dicted in research proposals written to se- cure funding. Moreover, most studies honored with publication benefit from journals’ preference for provocative, posi- tive findings. This may, at first, seem rea- sonable, until Freedman points out that when multiple studies address the same question, the ones with positive results are much more likely to see print, even if the majority present negative findings. In this sense, prestigious scientific journals are no better than tabloids: They seek out attention-grabbing headlines, and re- searchers are eager to oblige. Brazen fraud also plays a role in re-
search. Among other examples, Freed- man explains how an oncologist faked the
results of a widely praised genetics ex- periment by coloring white mice with a Magic Marker. Mice themselves are a problem, too. Researchers’ reliance on different species, subjected to extreme conditions, to shed light on human ailments falls under Freedman’s withering gaze. For instance, anyone who sees a correlation between human depression and the length of time a lab rat swims before giving up and float- ing is probably fooling himself. But Freedman’s lazy scientists are
Schulz’s self-deceived strivers. Experts are only human and, therefore, unaware of many of their mistakes, even if they profit from our culture of credulity. Despite this rash of errors, we remain in denial over our own fallibility — we’re our own worst experts. In her discussion of medical ex- pertise, Schulz writes, “What is both phil- osophically and practically interesting about [the question of medical error] is the paradox that lurks at its heart: if you want to try to eradicate error, you have to start by assuming that it is inevitable.” Perhaps this quasi-philosophical first premise should supplement Descartes’s cogito: Not only I think, therefore I am, but I’m certain, therefore I’m often wrong.
bookworld@washpost.com
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BEHROUZ MEHRI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his top commanders watch an air defense missile during Tehran’s Army Day parade on April 18. Iran has been subjected to international sanctions for its nuclear program.
Who will blink first when Iran is on the brink? F
iran from B1
constraints Obama would face could compel his administration to forgo the military option no matter how close Iran gets to joining the nuclear club. First, there is the United Nations to consider. Both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have centered their responses to Iran’s nuclear ambi- tions on the Security Council, implying that Iran’s conduct violates not just U.S. national security interests but also Teh- ran’s international legal obligations. For Obama, the United Nations has doctrinal centrality, as well. According to the presi- dent’s recently released National Security Strategy, “When force is necessary . . . we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.” Given this impulse to multilateralize the use of force and link it to the rule of law as well as to self-interest, the admin- istration would have a hard time attack- ing Iran without Security Council back- ing. This particular high ground, how- ever, might be unattainable. Indeed, the United States has obtained a series of U.N. resolutions censuring Iran not be- cause its legal arguments and foreign policy views have wowed the world, but simply because its European partners have feared that Washington might otherwise take matters into its own hands. These anxieties were more acute during the Bush years, but they have hardly dissipated with new occupants in the White House. From Europe’s perspec- tive, the U.N. process is designed not just to pressure Iran but also to enmesh the United States in cumbersome proceed- ings that limit its choices. It may be comforting for Washington to blame China and Russia as the key ob- stacles to more forceful measures against Iran, but Britain and France — where public opinion is already against partici- pation in the war in Afghanistan — also have little appetite for striking. An Oba- ma team that has prioritized repairing ties with “old Europe” and resetting rela-
tions with Russia would have to think twice before putting these refurbished re- lationships at risk by bombing Iran. (A president who meticulously rehabilitat- ed America’s standing in Europe would scarcely be eager to don Bush’s mantle as the Ugly American.) Whatever progress Iran may make toward weapons of mass destruction, Eu- ropean diplomats and statesmen are like- ly to parade to Washington, concede America’s concerns, affirm its intelli- gence findings — and reject its policy rec- ommendations. The United States would be advised to be patient and restock its economic sanctions kit for one more run at Tehran. In private, many strategists would summon their inner George Ken- nan and advise Washington that contain- ment has worked with more powerful and unpredictable tyrants and can surely handle cautious mullahs and their rudi- mentary weapon. Washington would have to choose between an international coalition pledging rigorous containment of Iran, and the lonely, unpopular path of taking military action lacking allied con- sensus.
D
omestic consensus would be crit- ical as well. One of the tragedies of American history is that presidents
have too often entangled the country in conflicts without forthright conversation with the public. Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson engaged in their share of measured mendacity as they plunged the United States into very different wars. More recently, Bush’s decision to preemptively invade Iraq was charac- terized by exaggerated threats and faulty information.
Obama came into office pledging a
new politics of accountability and re- sponsibility, suggesting a predisposition to engage the public on the possibility that the United States may find itself in a prolonged war with a damaged but dan- gerous adversary. From town halls to col- lege campuses, the president and his ad- visers would need to connect with civil society, clergy and university students —
not to mention Congress — on this crit- ical issue. The direction such a debate would take is hard to predict. According to a Febru- ary Gallup poll, about 90 percent of Americans believe Iran poses a serious threat to U.S. vital interests; 61 percent assessed the threat as “critical.” A Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll conducted in April found that 65 percent of Amer- icans favor military force as a way to pre- vent Iran from acquiring nuclear weap- ons. Yet, if skepticism about U.S. military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is any indication, Americans are also tired of war, while doubts about the accuracy of U.S. intelligence probably remain from the run-up to the Iraq war. A February CNN/Opinion Research poll indicated that only 23 percent of Americans agree with military action against Iran “now.” (This is one arena in which Iranian be- havior truly does matter; if President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other lead- ers indulge in incendiary rhetoric toward the United States or Israel, U.S. public opinion might be more likely to back the possibility of strikes.) The views and reactions of the Arab world would also be relevant. Although the United States is certainly capable of attacking Iran’s nuclear installations without the consent or cooperation of the United Nations or of European allies, it would be hard-pressed to do so without the help of the small countries on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Fifth Fleet is headquartered
in Bahrain; the Combined Air Operations Center is in Qatar; prepositioned materi- el for ground and other forces is in Ku- wait and Oman; and the United Arab Emirates offers extensive port facilities and staging for tactical aircraft. A cam- paign against Iran would require not just the acquiescence of these governments but their willingness to absorb retalia- tion by a bruised and outraged neighbor for years to come. While defense agree- ments already in place do not legally obli- gate the United States to come to the aid
of these countries, strategic imperatives nonetheless would commit Washington to their defense. Such commitments would weigh heavily on an administra- tion pondering the use of force.
inally, a perceived need to warn Iran of a potential attack could compli- cate a decision to use force. As a na-
tion, we have traditionally been averse to sneak attacks against even our most un- savory foes. American history is riddled with moments of hesitation and self- restraint even during high-pressure epi- sodes. President John F. Kennedy reject- ed a surprise attack during the Cuban missile crisis on the grounds that it would transgress America’s long-stand- ing principles; Secretary of State James Baker met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in 1991 to give Saddam Hus- sein’s regime one last chance before air- strikes commenced.
Such warnings run counter to the mili-
tary advantages of a bolt-from-the-blue attack. And while American diplomats would argue cogently that Iran’s mullahs might blink when confronted with such a dire warning, military planners would prefer surprise as a way to mitigate the dangers of an already risky and complex operation.
Obama would have to decide whether the legitimacy conferred by a last-ditch warning of an attack was worth the sacri- fice of tactical advantage. In the end, the balance would probably tip in favor of the moral (rather than operational) consider- ations, because the spiraling tension and flow of military assets to the gulf would give Tehran all the warning it needed. As it contemplated the use of force, the administration’s decision-making would be further complicated by the need for a plan to unwind military hostilities and make sure a confrontation did not esca- late out of control. The White House would have to signal to Tehran that the U.S. military objective was not to over- throw the clerical regime but to enforce the will of the international community by disabling Iran’s nuclear program. The
message would need to make clear that for the United States, hostilities would end with the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities, but that if Iran retaliated, Washington would press its attacks until Tehran could no longer respond. A so- bering thought not just for the mullahs, but also for a U.S. administration that would have to carry out the threat. Administration planners might be tempted to assume that reason would prevail in Tehran — that a chastised and crestfallen theocracy would confine its response to organizing large demonstra- tions while basking in the allegiance of a more unified nation and that privately, Iran’s leaders would concede to the logic of power and desist from a conflict that their country could not win. But prudence would lead the national
security team to counsel the president to plan for a potentially prolonged conflict. The Iranian regime may find heightened nationalism useful in diverting attention from the deficiencies of its rule, but to mollify its public, the theocratic leader- ship may be pressed into a more open confrontation with the “Great Satan.” Caution and circumspection evaporate in a tense atmosphere, and the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s response to a strike would seriously burden the president’s decision-making. There are plausible developments that could render this scenario moot. Iran has notified the International Atomic Energy Agency that it is prepared to resume ne- gotiations after Ramadan on the transfer of nuclear fuel to third countries for en- richment. And in the face of strong sanc- tions, the mullahs may well blink. But to avoid the grim future postulated
here, Iran would have to leave behind its peek-a-boo negotiating tactics and sign up for intrusive inspections and tight limits on its uranium enrichment activ- ities. The record on this score is not en- couraging, with decades of sanctions im- peding but not blocking Iran’s progress to nuclear weapons capability. Thus, the world imagined here may not constitute destiny — but it will be hard to escape.
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