EMPIRICAL RESULTS 31
The most common FUG productive assets acquired were water and irriga- tion equipment, which 118 of 489 Fadama II households (24 percent) obtained (Table 5.4). The value of FUG water and irrigation equipment increased by 2,771 percent (from 47,475 nairas before the project to 1,362,937 nairas by September 2006), highlighting the large impact that Fadama II had on the value of productive assets. Furthermore, individually owned water and irriga- tion assets more than doubled in value over the same period. Total values of processing equipment, livestock, and building structures owned by FUGs more than doubled. The large increases for individual productive-asset types add up to a large rise in the total value of productive assets, especially for ben- eficiaries in the poorest asset tercile, who had few productive assets before the project.
The percentage increase in value of group-owned productive assets in the upper asset tercile that was due to Fadama II participation was only 63 percent—the smallest—but the absolute value (of ATT) was the second largest. The value of productive assets owned by women’s EIGs participating in the project also increased significantly compared with that belonging to women’s groups not participating in the project. These results demonstrate that the PAA component succeeded in its efforts to target poor and vulnerable groups. Compared with all nonbeneficiaries and with nonbeneficiaries in and outside Fadama II communities, project beneficiaries experienced greater increases in the value of individually owned productive assets. The impact of Fadama II on these assets was not significant across all zones for the clustered standard errors. Comparisons between male beneficiaries and nonbeneficia- ries showed significantly greater percentage and absolute value increases in the value of private productive assets for beneficiaries. Comparison of the ATT of individually owned assets for female-headed household beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries showed no significant difference for both clustered and unclustered standard errors, suggesting that the impact of the program on female heads of households did not trickle down to private assets, which the program does not support (NFDO 2006). This result is to be expected, given that the poor cannot simultaneously afford to pay their share of the 30 per- cent matching funds to buy the group-owned assets and at the same time buy private assets.
Surprisingly, the value of individually owned productive assets of benefi- ciaries and nonbeneficiaries decreased significantly for the humid zone, for all women’s groups, and for all groups in asset terciles 2 and 3 (the wealthier terciles) (see Table 5.3). One possible reason for this trend could be the lack of credit that forces potential Fadama II beneficiaries to liquidate their pri- vate assets. This explanation is supported by the corresponding increase in group-owned assets for the beneficiaries in most groups studied. But as shown
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