2 CHAPTER 1
knowledge to define and identify the targeted groups (Mansuri and Rao 2004). A recent study in Senegal showed that a CDD project increased the access of poor families to clean water and health services and increased their con- sumption expenditures (Arcand and Bassole 2007). This study also noted that village chiefs and local governments played a major role in the placement of CDD projects. Several studies have also shown that CDD programs have been effective in targeting the poor in communities with strong local institu- tions and fairly homogeneous socioeconomic characteristics (Bardhan and Mookherjee 1999; Conning and Kevane 2002; Platteau 2004; Galasso and Raval- lion 2005).
However, elite capture—in which a few individuals in a local community have disproportionate political or economic power and dominate community- based planning, governance, and benefits from community-based programs— remains one of the major challenges of the CDD approach (Dasgupta and Beard 2007). Studies have identified cases of elite capture and failure to empower local communities to participate in development programs. Platteau (2004) observed that a large share of financial support by a foreign nongovern- mental organization (NGO) to farmer organizations in western Africa was appropriated by local leaders. Consistent with Ostrom (1990), Platteau (2004) also observed that elite capture is a common problem for many donor-funded projects that support local communities with weak local institutions. Elite capture has even been reported in communities with strong democratic institutions. Dasgupta and Beard (2007) observed that communities with demo- cratic institutions in Indonesia restricted allocation of resources to their poor- est members. Surprisingly, this study also observed better targeting of the poor in communities controlled by elites. Based on this observation, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) conclude that there is a difference between elite capture and elite control; in the second case, only decisions are controlled by elites, but resource allocation is targeted to the poor.
Heterogeneity also leads to elite capture and ineffective focus on the poor. Conning and Kevane (2002) observed that the ability of CDD projects to target the poor in heterogeneous communities with high social inequality was worse than that of externally managed programs, whereas the opposite was true in egalitarian communities with open and transparent systems of decisionmaking.
Our study assessed the impact of the CDD project Fadama II, which is the largest agricultural project in Nigeria. Fadama II aims to reduce poverty by supporting communities to acquire infrastructure and productive assets, pro- viding demand-driven advisory services, increasing the capacity of communi- ties to manage economic activities, and reducing conflicts among resource
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