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+ AUTOCAB’ WITH EYES WIDE OPEN


later control and monetise the segments in which they operate. Which leads to the next question being raised...


HOW CAN AUTOCAB BE TRULY RUN INDEPENDENTLY FROM UBER?


There are indeed many cases of tech companies acquiring oth- ers and leaving them alone to do what they do best. For instance, Microsoft acquired Linkedin which has actually flour- ished under relative independence. But there, Linkedin’s social business network did not compete at all against Microsoft’s core businesses in Office software/cloud computing/Xbox gaming etc. That’s not the case with Uber and Autocab, where Uber is in the same game, and still competing directly with many of Autocab’s operator clients in certain locations.


COULD UBER USE AUTOCAB’S NETWORK AS A ‘TROJAN HORSE’ TO LAUNCH ITS OWN OPERATIONS IN EACH TOWN OR CITY?


The narrative coming from Autocab is that Uber, I expect driven by a post-Covid-19 world, is no longer seeking to expand every- where organically and that local cab fleet partnerships are their future. As mentioned earlier, it doesn’t yet seem clear if and how Uber could be technically or legally prevented from seeing the anonymised demand profiles of Autocab’s operator fleets, even as part of some day maintaining its software.


Importantly, many are questioning if Uber could build up viable demand in a particular city or town off the back of an Autocab operator and its drivers that have become overly reliant on it, only for Uber to then secure its own operator licence there and get drivers to switch. I’m sure Autocab and Uber expected this and are making a case that this won’t be the case.


A concern is that Uber, which has claimed it wants to be the ‘Amazon of transport’, ends up in a similar scenario on which Amazon’s CEO was recently facing congressional scrutiny. Amazon started retailing its own products directly to cus- tomers, then opened up to offering other retailers as well, undermining its own partnerships with the likes of, most famously, Toys‘R’Us which never recovered. It’s now being accused of its own employees accessing the sales data for which of its retailers’ products do well, to then launch compet- ing products against them - which Amazon’s CEO has said he can’t guarantee against.


WHAT COULD UBER DO IN CITIES/TOWNS WHERE EITHER AUTOCAB HAS NO OPERATOR CLIENTS, OR AT LEAST OPERATORS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN UBER JOBS AS PART OF iGO?


Autocab indicates it will continue its licence fee model but now with Uber’s $billions in cash, could Uber afford to give Autocab software for significantly reduced or even no cost to other fleets in its coverage blackspots as a means to secure supply? Could Autocab fleets taking on Uber jobs be recategorised as top tier clients, with access to new/premium features? One might argue that Autocab’s team has long been conditioned to treat all their clients equally, but who knows if Uber’s management share the same sentiments? Silicon Valley companies are renowned for maximising data and market share, even at a significant loss, to


SEPTEMBER 2020


It’s not uncommon for some/all of the team of an acquired com- pany to eventually retire to the beach (wouldn’t we all want that!), or worse, be swapped out for the acquirer’s senior lieu- tenants or subsumed into their own tech or operations teams. A good example of this is Facebook acquiring Instagram and Whatsapp, where the latter’s founders initially stayed on after acquisition, glowing about their independence - only to be swapped out with Facebook veterans when Facebook eventual- ly got its way about how data was to be integrated, amongst other things.


The Autocab team has done a superb job gaining the trust of its operators over many years and so clarity about how its inde- pendence under Uber could actually be preserved indefinitely can help.


I feel somewhat for the Autocab team as it will no doubt be bombarded with so many what if’s, as is to be expected. Setting aside the genuine motivations of Autocab’s team, Uber is rightly or wrongly perceived by many operators as an aggressive dis- rupter that often undercut other operators, putting them out of business. Therefore, convincing the incumbent cab operator community that a Silicon Valley leopard has changed its spots, friend to some operators but foe to others, won’t be an easy task!


At a time when many operators are desperate for work after the Covid-19 lockdown, it’s important they rationally consider how the judgments they make now regarding their business and data play out not just in three months’ time, but in three years and even six years’ time...as I say, with their eyes wide open. It would be a shame if, without proper scrutiny, Britain’s hard working cab operators unwittingly end up ceding data insights for Silicon Valley companies to solely harvest and mon- etise.


Meantime, we at minicabit will continue to be the independent, neutral comparison site that empowers local cab operators UK- wide to gain new customers online. With another 70 operators joining our network so far this summer, it’s not all Uber for our industry!


Amer Hasan is CEO of minicabit, Britain’s largest cab comparison site


minicabit.com/phtm 7


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