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PSC inspection Severity


Ship related factors were mostly Low (green flagged) based on the previous ship’s and manager’s PSC history under the MoU.


Although the manager’s PSC history under the MoU was assessed as medium risked, some parameters were specifically red flagged:


- The manager’s Deficiency per Inspection in Port


- The manager’s Detention Profile vs Port Detainable Items


- The manager’s Deficiency Profile vs Port Top 20 Deficiency Codes


The most dangerous set of parameters was the Port related factors which are assessed to be high risk (red flag) shown below which are higher than relevant ports worldwide for General Cargo Ships’ inspections.


- Port Deficiency Codes spread - Port Detention Ratio over 12 months


Additionally, the Concentrated Inspection Campaign on Fire Safety was in progress during ship’s PSC inspection.


Taking into consideration the above Inspection Probability and Inspection Severity, the overall POCRA assessment was that the call risk was High, and this should have been sufficient to act as an alert to be prepared.


Root Causes


Almost 90% of ships being detained have zero detentions in the 36 months prior. Research has provided evidence that ships are being detained for the following key reasons:


a) Inadequate identification that the ship will be inspected. It was evident in this case by the end result.


b) Inadequate preparation by the crew as far as the ship’s is concerned. Numerous deficiencies found in the areas where weekly inspections are due such as FFA, safety of navigation, propulsion and machinery are testimony to that.


c) Inadequate MLC implementation. The living and working conditions on board show gaps from the level required by common good practice.


The lessons to be Learned


There are several lessons to be learned from this case.


- The ship’s MLC preparation and implementation on board was of a low level.


- Four deficiencies on life saving appliances are too many, as the SOLAS weekly inspections cover such issues.


- The two detainable deficiencies on Fire Safety indicate that there was no CiC awareness advance or preparation.


- As PSC inspections aim to identify safety gaps onboard, having too many technical/ procedural issues unattended will probably lead to detention.


About RISK4SEA Port Call Risk Assessment


- Extreme caution should be exercised with the handling of the ISM Codes. It is recommended that an additional audit onboard the ship is carried out to verify the SMS implementation (regardless of whether or not this is required by the PSCO or not).


The Port Call Risk Assessment (POCRA) is an automated Risk Assessment of the ship, the manager and port specific risk factors. It generates a detailed focused PSC Inspection Checklist which helps to prepare for a PSC inspection.


THE REPORT | DEC 2023 | ISSUE 106 | 119


PSC Inspection Result


The ship docked at Immingham and PSCO boarded to inspect and to check the ship’s safety status and condition. The result of the PSC inspection was 20 deficiencies, 4 of which were detainable. As is expected in such situations, the code 15150 - ISM was marked to engage the manager to provide verification of the ISM Implementation on board through an ISM Audit.


The breakdown of the Deficiency Areas that the ship found to be unsafe were:


POCRA preparation checklist


If the vessel had used the POCRA preparation checklist, the findings may have produced a different outcome. The POCRA checklist in Immingham for bulk carriers generates a full and specific checklist including 48 items. This checklist includes all detainable items identified during inspection. If the vessel had prepared properly the detention could have been avoided.


Source: RISK4SEA


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