TRANSCRIPTS
Next, management has to ensure that all materials and substances are stored, moved and used safely. We could think of explosive or flammable gases, such as oxygen, hydrogen or methane. These gases are often stored in pressurized cylinders, which must be kept in ventilated cages outside buildings, so that in the case of a leak, there’s no dangerous build-up of gas.
Fifthly, there has to be immediate and adequate assistance when problems arise. Hazards and emergency buttons should be clearly indicated at the point of risk and everyone should know who the first aid officers are. And emergency procedures should be well established and practised, so that everyone knows what to do.
The next duty is that all incidents should be reported promptly, investigated thoroughly and systems put in place to prevent a repetition. Reporting quite a minor incident and working out what went wrong can often prevent a more serious incident in the future. With very serious incidents involving loss of life, government safety officers will become involved and there may be a legal investigation and even changes to the law.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is essential training and supervision. Employees need to know what to do, not only when things are going ‘normally’, but also when unusual situations occur.
In the next two parts of the lecture, we’ll look firstly at two incidents in the oil industry and then at a railway incident where one or more of these principles were overlooked. As we shall see, the results can be disastrous if risk assessments aren’t undertaken or reviewed, if there’s inadequate training of employees, or if cost-cutting reduces safety.
Unit 9, Lesson 9.2, Exercise C ≤2.10
Part 2 Let’s move on now to examine the first of two oil rig disasters to find out what went wrong, using the GRACE system (that’s G-R-A-C-E). GRACE is a training tool to improve safety, by learning from previous incidents where mistakes were made.
BP designed the GRACE system for the petroleum industry, but increasingly we find that it’s been taken up by many other industries.
This first case concerns the Glomar Arctic IV mobile exploration oil rig which was docked in Dundee harbour in Scotland for repairs in 1998.
Two welders were working inside one of the legs
of the rig when a propane gas leak, from a damaged hose, ignited as they attempted to light a cutting torch. There was an explosion and a fire in which both men were killed. Molten metal particles had previously fallen on the hose during their repair work and this had caused a hole from which the gas leaked.
Now, this may sound like a simple accident, but
the investigation by the Scottish courts revealed that the company had ignored a whole range of health and safety regulations.
l For a start, no proper risk assessment had been carried out by either the rig operators or the contractors. Nor was there even an adequate understanding of the risks involved in working in confined spaces with the possibility of a gas leak.
l Secondly, it was found that the workers were not properly trained or supervised.
l Thirdly, a system of safety checks hadn’t been followed.
l And fourthly, it was found that there were no fire extinguishers or gas detectors at the scene; nor were the workers provided with breathing apparatus or a means of communication with deck personnel. In fact, there was no clear plan for dealing with an emergency.
l Just two days before the accident, the company had refused to let the local fire brigade make an inspection, saying that they had their own firefighting team. But this firefighting team was unable to deal with the emergency as it had had no training for such an event. As a result, the fire brigade couldn’t reach the workers in time because, firstly, they didn’t know the layout of the rig, and secondly, access to the accident area was extremely difficult and unsafe.
So, what lessons can we learn from this case?
Well, firstly and most importantly, risk assessments must be made in all situations, however simple they may seem. And these assessments must be reviewed. What would a risk assessment of this case have concluded? First, the job was in a confined space, and welding uses an open flame. So, there was the risk of fire. Second, with a fire hazard, the company should have asked for a fire inspection themselves. Instead, they prevented one from taking place.
Research has shown that the preventative measures in this case would not have added
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