issue that we are working closely with Manscen on is establishing concepts for the future forces. They are defining the question: what capability do they want in a future US Army? It is going to have a C- IED, four-tiered capability: intrusive and non-intrusive screening, specialist screening by EOD personnel, and forensic lab support. This ATO will touch on every one of those tiers to help them make informed decisions on those capabilities.
GW: While the ATO pushes unknown bulk explosives to the forefront, due to its title it clearly isn’t just about bulk, since trace detection would be anything but – from a milligram to a dirty fingerprint. So what would you say the percentage split is between bulk, trace, fate and forensics? AF: We started out with bulk explosive detection and that was a driving factor, primarily because there were so many reports. Most of the data coming out of theatre indicated that the explosive was unknown. Since then however, that challenge has been overcome. Initially the project was composed of three equal parts: one third bulk detection, one third agent fate and one third forensics. Those measures have shifted as our needs have – not only within the program but also as we finished things. We have a good idea on the agent fate and that work has concluded and gone into open literature. Right now, a lot of effort is focussed on forensics support as well as trace detection, and we are finishing up with fault properties that do both trace and bulk detection – so it is moving more towards trace. To be honest, if the warfighter had asked for bulk detection several years ago we could have deployed capability for it, but they kept asking for trace and that is a harder problem.
GW: Quantity of explosive is not necessarily the best differentiator as it has a direct correlation to skill-set and solution. Bulk explosive tests might require a wet chemistry swab done by a frontline warfighter in a hostile environment, whilst trace detection might require a specialist using an updated library in an existing detector in a difficult environment. Forensics meanwhile might involve a criminal
investigator requiring something that doesn’t exist in a benign environment… AF: Trace detection is harder than that. It is not just about updating a library with spectra, there are some fundamental physics that need to be understood. If you have a bulk material and you are collecting a sample or looking at it through an optical, then the bulk signal – at least the majority of it – is from that material. When you have trace material that is deposited on a surface, the background becomes the major contributor to that signature, and we find that the signature changes based on the loading level, particle size, and environmental considerations. It is not necessarily as simple as updating a library, it is about understanding how the material interacts with the environment and the surface. That fundamental understanding has been lacking, and we are trying to fill those gaps, not only to improve signatures but also to be able to choose the right detector.
GW: Without sounding like a Harry Potter fanatic, is it not fair to say that sometimes the detector chooses the responder?! The amount of information that a scientist can get out of a portable GCMS for example, is far greater than the average responder. So my question is: are you forced into making choices in terms of the detection level that require certain tools to be used by individuals with certain skills? In other words, can you make assumptions about how an individual will use each tool, and what their level of understanding will be? AF: We have to work across a couple of spectrums. There are tools that we are trying to provide to the soldier – the Shed kit is one of those – that allows someone without any technical background in chemistry to make a presumptive identification or collect information. We are trying to provide information to the specialist level: the EOD tech, or to CBRNE SSE [Sensitive Site Exploitation] teams, where they do have some knowledge. They are not scientists, but they are better trained, have an idea of hazmat mitigation, and so we provide them with additional information. Then you have the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell
(CEXC) labs or forensics lab, where you might have someone who is a degree professional and has more knowledge and needs additional tools.
GW: As is often the case when you put detection devices in the hands of the lowest common denominator, the first thing you get is a massive wave of false alarms, followed by an equally large wave of disenchantment. How then do you educate the soldier that, if he gets a hit of nitrate, the perpetrator is as likely to be a farmer as a bomber? How do you get to the stage of saying you need pre-cursor A, B and C before you get worried? AF: US Army Training and Doctrine Command (Tradoc) wanted something at the lowest skill level for the detection of HME precursors, but also something that would have pretty good fidelity on identification and materials. That was the impetus for the Shed kit. Colorimetric chemistry has been around for a long time, and they have been primarily packaged differently for different markets. If you have a nitrate detector that only detects nitrate for law enforcement, that may be enough. But a lot of these kits are one offs, that only give you one piece of the information; if you need more information you need to use a different kit. The emphasis for the Shed kit, like the M256 [Military Chemical Agent Detection Kit, Ed.], where you have one kit that when exposed to chemical agent identifies by a logic tree that if you get those colour change you have this agent, if not it is this one. The Shed kit does the same thing, it allows the solider to assign a unique colour change to each of the precursor components – to say whether or not you have, for example, ammonia nitrate, urea, urea nitrate, perchlorate or chlorate. This gives the soldier additional information in a single hit, without having to waste time and employ different kits to go through all those steps.
GW: In terms of standoff detection, I saw the Alakai system in Fort Leonard Wood and was quite impressed by what they had achieved. I had a slight qualm about some of their active standoff,
www.cbrneworld.com CBRNe South America 2012, 13-14 March, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. More information on
www.icbrnevents.com
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