Jesse Garrick on the public information lessons from the recent H5N1 incident H5N1:
The False Dilemma Y
ou will all recall H5N1: the highly pathogenic subtype of the influenza A virus – commonly referred to as ‘bird flu’ or ‘avian influenza’. “The H5N1 virus subtype”, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO), “first infected humans in 1997 during a poultry outbreak in Hong Kong SAR, China. Since its widespread re-emergence in 2003 and 2004, this avian virus has spread from Asia to Europe and Africa and has become entrenched in poultry in some countries, resulting in millions of poultry infections, several hundred human cases, and many human deaths.” The WHO report goes on to stress the fact that H5N1 remains the influenza subtype with the most pandemic potential, which is why news that research teams at the University of Wisconsin in the US and the Erasmus University in the Netherlands have developed an even more fatal mutation of the subtype is all the more alarming. This new strain has so far only been tested on ferrets – a conventional model for human influenza – but has demonstrated an enhanced ability to transmit from one to another, leading scientists to suspect it capable of the same behaviour in humans – a quality that H5N1 has not hitherto demonstrated to any effect.
Notwithstanding the fact that this research has been carried out in secure facilities, there are justified fears that these new influenza strains may find their way in to the possession of terrorists, with potentially disastrous consequences. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) has called for selective censorship of the findings, as have many in and outside of the scientific community, whilst the work of both research teams has been suspended under a sixty-day
moratorium until the case is brought before an international scientific forum for further examination.
The international forum will no doubt question the extent to which both research teams considered the ethics of their research prior to its undertaking, as well as the extent to which it fell within the BWC, as legitimate research relating to peaceful purposes and public health protection. Both considerations are encouraged by international regulations and treaties – such as the BWC and the 2005 International Health Regulations – that seek to encourage bio-surveillance and public safety, though often do not apply to medical research such as this. It will be interesting to see if the BWC will apply to research on H5N1, moreover if the fact that the research teams are located in different countries, i.e., jurisdictions, will make the forum’s judgement any more difficult – or, indeed, the BWC more necessary. Also worth considering is the extent to which laws on freedom of expression and international human rights might form some part of the forum’s decision-making process. What makes this case particularly
worthy of CBRNe World’s attention is the manner in which it has polarised debate. Many scientists have been outraged that their right to publish and freedom of expression are being called into question (as long as the great unwashed hear nothing about it then it is fine), whilst politicians and the public have responded in typically reactive fashion (Medical research? Pandemic? Terrorism? Are these guys crazy?). The latter will generally always act in a most herd-like fashion, but it is the outrage of the former that raises more of a concern. The BWC has been working hard over the past 35 years (but more noisily in the last ten) to raise
understanding of what dual-use research is, as well as emphasise the implications of publishing research that could aid offensive BWAs. This is not to suggest that the H5N1 work fell into this category, but the simple truth is that this debate has given rise – judging by the high dudgeon of many in and outside of the scientific community – to a fallacy of false choice within popular culture: the work of life-science is becoming irrationally aligned to bio- terrorism in the media, and within the scientific community there is an understandable disbelief of the public’s outrage and cynicism. Surely, bio- terrorism is the preserve of the evil, and since I am a scientist pursuing legitimate research, why should I have to explain myself?
The recent frenzy around H5N1 research is an indicator that the BWC work has yet to make much headway with the scientific community, and relations between the two will be of paramount importance. Perhaps the worst indictment of this research has come from the scientific journal Nature’s suggestion that it may not be in the short-term public interest, as many scientists have suggested: “Scientists need to be more modest and realistic with their claims about the short-term public-health benefits of such research,” their editorial concluded. The forum will have their work cut out narrowing these divides, deciding what is to be done with the strains, and who will have access to them. Simultaneously, the longer term strategy will no doubt involve the development of superior international governance of scientific research, aided by stronger international, scientific cooperation. Of the BWC, the question to be asked of them is “well, what now?”
CBRNe South America 2012, 13-14 March, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. More information on
www.icbrnevents.com 8 CBRNe WORLD February 2012
www.cbrneworld.com
CBRNeWORLD
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