Dr.Augustus Fountain, senior research scientist at the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC), talks to Gwyn Winfield about their explosive detection work – from bulk to forensics


Bang to rights


GW: ECBC has been working on an Army Technology Objective (ATO), Detection of Unknown Bulk Explosives (UBEs), which has covered a wide variety of fields: standoff, point and trace detection, forensics, and agent fate. The ATO has been aimed at integrating explosives (especially homemade explosives) detection into CBRN point, proximity, and standoff sensors – as well as improving the dismounted soldiers’ ability to detect explosives. The ATO will then incorporate the concepts, with the assistance of the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (Manscen) for requirements, into the whole Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework. The US Army’s involvement in explosive detection is not a new thing, so why is it that the ECBC has become involved, and what makes their contribution different? AF: That question came up when we started, but this is not a new project. Prior to joining the ECBC in 2006, General (Ret.) Meigs was director of Jieddo (Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization) and I was a professor of chemistry at West Point. He contacted me and said, ‘we have a chemical detection problem with IEDs’. He asked me to take a look, to see what I could do, and with some Jieddo funding we looked at explosive detection from a chemical detection standpoint. A lot of the explosive detection and countermine work that had previously been done fell into three camps: countermine detection work, done either through engineers’ or the U.S. Army’s Communications- Electronic Research, Development, and Engineering Center’s (CERDEC) Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate (NVESD) labs, which was focussed on finding devices (and there was not a lot of chemical detection in that work); there was some agent fate work, but it was a different threat because landmines buried


in the ground for many decades interact with the soil, so their explosive material either goes through the process of natural biodegradation or it leaches out into the water table (and there are tell- tale chemical signatures associated with that) and IEDs, where you don’t have the same timescale so the signatures are different. When you look at explosive detection from the standpoint of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) or the Home Office, you are looking for explosives in an environment where you wouldn’t naturally see an explosive. So an explosive in an airport is an anomaly, i.e., you wouldn’t expect it and it is easier to detect, rather than an explosive on a battlefield where there have been other explosives used. So while a lot of the objective is not new in concept, it is in approach: you have the attribution piece, but it has to be for that event, not an IED from two weeks ago! With the Jieddo funding we started to look at that approach for chemical detection, then in 2010 the US Army funded this effort as Jieddo moved away from funding fundamental research studies, and it was ripe for going into a 6.2 (applied research) program. Consequently the Army picked it up as a three-year technology objective. We are in the final year of this objective and the aim is to look at some of the fundamental, applied research lines to address the detection of explosive threats in a combat environment, as well as make detection recommendations for future efforts. We are leveraging the 90-plus years in chemical detection. In past conflicts we looked at CWA and the principals for the detection of chemicals, especially hazmat in the environment, no matter if it is CWA of explosives. Now we are applying that depth of experience to another chemical threat.


GW: As you stated, it is more about applied research rather than basic, and


as such you are developing products such as Shed (Squad HME Detector), based on the same colorimetric concept/team that created the M256, and from there it is a short hop to concepts of use. So do you see this as a strictly OCONUS operations tool, or do you see it having viability for civilian forces in the US? AF: We have remained in close cooperation with the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as we are trying to understand the challenges of detecting these explosives. But even though we are focussed on the warfighter, it can certainly be demonstrated on the home front. We are in close cooperation with DHS Science & Technology, the TSA Lab in Atlantic City, as well as other performers that have been funded by DHS, so they can gain from our experience and help guide future efforts. Our objective clearly does have the legs to move into the realm of the DHS, or to support law enforcement and responders, which the US Department of Justice (DOJ) has tended to fund. So we are not just focussing on warfighters. We recognise that IEDs are going to be the asymmetric weapon of choice for future terrorists, and we need to think: not only, how do we improve the capability for soldiers in Afghanistan, but what next, where do we go? What enduring capability do we want to take from the current fight into the future, either in terms of counter-insurgency or force-on- force? Whether it is for counter- insurgency or conventional use, IED’s are a poor man’s artillery – where you wait for the target to move to you and command-detonate it. One of the issues that we are trying to wrestle with is what capabilities do we want? Some form of C- IED is going to be in that kitbag for the future force, and we are still wrestling with that. We are in the 6.2, 6.3 [applied development Ed.] area, where it has applicability for the future. The other


CBRNe South America 2012, 13-14 March, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. More information on www.icbrnevents.com 50 CBRNe WORLD February 2012 www.cbrneworld.com


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