Able Bodied
attack, the indications will probably be the same: people getting sick. Response will be the same as well, regardless of the origin. That is why it is so important to unite the efforts of public health systems, first responders, and military capabilities. This exercise focused on US/ROK whole-of- government response to natural contagious disease outbreaks, accidents, and bio-terrorist incidents on the Korean peninsula. SLS discussions led to many
recommendations aimed at improving bio-surveillance, diagnostics, forensics, information sharing, civil and military operations, as well as policies that were presented during the SLS. The seminar was attended by a host of senior ROK and US government representatives. Senior ROK leaders represented included the Director of Management of National Crisis from the Office of the President, the Korean Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC), Korean Arms Verification Agency (KAVA), Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defense Command, Ministry of Administration and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Ministry of National Defense (MND), local firemen, Anti-Terrorism ROK National Police (KNP), National Emergency Management Agency, Director of Arms Reduction and Non- Proliferation, and the Deputy Minister for Defense Policy.
Senior US leaders included the US
Embassy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ASD- NCB) Commander USFK and 8th Army from US Forces Korea, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Test and Evaluation (DUSA-TE), Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical & Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD), OSD Policy, USPACOM Medical Command, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Dept of Homeland Security/Health Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
WMD Directorate, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI/WMD), 20th SUPCOM, Office of the Surgeon General Medical CBRN, Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Pacific Air Force Surgeon, Public Health Cmd- Pacific, USFK Surgeon, and many other organisations.
General Sharp emphasised the fact that “together, the success we achieved through exercises and close coordination was not because of our nation’s individual efforts. Rather, we achieved success because of the combined work of our two nations. Together, the ROK/US Alliance is seen as a model of stability and prosperity throughout the world.” This exercise includes so many separate agencies from both nations that will enhance overall WMD incident planning, but with a whole-of-government approach when dealing with national emergency incidents and crisis. Both he and Weber emphasised the view that “the most important points that each of us take away from this week should not be about the many challenges that exist. Rather, the most important points to take away will be the increased understanding of those capabilities which exist separate from our own. All of us bring unique perspectives and knowledge to this exercise.” This threat is real. The cost of not investing is catastrophic, especially in light of the disastrous potential of new outbreaks and incidents. Furthermore, there is an enhanced risk for this threat and a real concern among ROK senior leadership over the use of non- attributable biological threats. Andrew Weber commented that “we must think about whole-of-government solutions. Bio-defense requires the best minds and capabilities from across the Government. This exercise is a unique opportunity for Korea to be a regional and global leader in bio-defense.” As a direct result of these efforts and the related exercise – which provided a unique opportunity to develop and refine the national bio-defense systems, develop inter-agency doctrine and identify gaps and required capabilities – we will all be better prepared. This effort needs to be sustained long after
General Sharp ©DoD
this exercise. We need to start to look at going beyond tabletops, to functional and full-scale exercises. In summary, the intent and focus of these efforts were met, and fostered collaboration with US/ROK interagencies. The discussions led to 29 recommendations for the improvement of bio-surveillance, diagnostics, forensics, information sharing, civil/military operations, and policies. Eight of the
recommendations were materiel related, and focused on improving environmental surveillance, vaccine development, laboratories, diagnostics, and advances in crisis communications capabilities. Groundwork was laid out to enhance emergency response capabilities, the improvement of NBC defence capabilities, and improved interactions among US interagencies including the FBI, DHS, DNI, and CDC. This unique and extremely successful, exercise resulted in a consensus for continued future bi- lateral whole-of-government exercises and opened discussions, in reference to Able Response 12, as momentum was gaining toward combating WMD threats in Korea.
CBRNe South America 2012, 13-14 March, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. More information on
www.icbrnevents.com 48 CBRNe WORLD February 2012
www.cbrneworld.com
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