Inspector Mark Roberts PhD, from the Police Service of Northern Ireland, on their CBRN capability and how it fits into the all hazards approach
Northern Exposure
‘Threat’ is a word that is charged with some generally unhelpful connotations. When, as police, we consider CBRN threats, the majority of hazards we face tend to be chemical, followed by biological, then radiological and finally nuclear,. Chemicals can present themselves as hazards either directly as a chemical terrorist attack or more often as site hazards of drug or bomb labs, chemical suicides, accidents and other numerous scenarios.
This range of scenarios cannot all be treated as ‘the main event’. Whilst there is commonality between how these incidents might be treated, there has to be a sense of proportionality and scalability. In the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) this has taken the form of Policy Directive 08/09: PSNI response to CBRN incidents and incidents involving white powders and other suspicious incidents. The term CBRN is used in the context of an actual or threatened dispersal of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material (either on their own or in combination with each other or explosives) with deliberate criminal, malicious or murderous intent, targeted at a given population or an economic or symbolic place.
The term white powder is used in the context of a suspicious unidentified powder, of any colour, not believed to be explosive or drugs. A suspicious substance is a suspicious unidentified solid, liquid, gel, crystal or granular material, of any colour, not believed to be explosive or drugs. None of the above are hazmat incidents, but any incidents of a chemical or biological nature should be approached in the same manner – this includes a response to explosives and drugs incidents.
In approaching the event it is wise to take an initial assessment of whether the incident can be considered an ‘authenticated’ CBRN incident, in much the same way as explosive devices have been treated in the past. In simple terms, an incident might be considered authenticated where, following the
assessment, there is sufficient information and/or intelligence to suggest that the incident involves a genuine threat or risk and that a CBRN event may have occurred. Conversely, where there is insufficient information or intelligence to suggest the incident involves a genuine threat or risk or that a CBRN incident has occurred, the incident may be considered ‘non-authenticated’. This must not be misconstrued as meaning that there is no possibility of any threat being associated with the incident. Further enquires may still be required to establish the appropriate level of response.
So it is easy to say that someone ‘just needs to carry out an initial assessment’, but in practical terms one must ask the questions: what should that look like, and what needs to be considered? Importantly, the onus is on the officer to use the fullest extent of his or her experience and training in the assessment, as well as to draw on intelligence, reach-back and other information sources to assess the scene. The following questions should certainly be considered, though they aren’t necessarily the only ones: – Whether any symptomology is being displayed by anyone involved in the incident, and if so whether the symptoms can be rationalised in terms of the incident.
– Whether there are any indicators associated with the incidents or target location.
– Whether a threat or a malicious intent has been stated or implied in the development of the incident.
The answers should also take into consideration whether or not an incident of this nature or against this target was anticipated, or whether similar incidents are taking place at this time or have done in the recent past. Foremost in the officer’s mind though is preservation of life: no assessment or activity should be allowed to needlessly place life in hazard through omission or inactivity. This initial assessment of the incident leads into a grading of the level of
response required. Important considerations include: where the threat is authenticated, whether the package or container is open or not, and whether the substance has been spilled or not. Also, following the assessment of all information and intelligence, if there is sufficient evidence to indicate that a CBRN event has occurred, an extremely high degree of caution is required, including additional multi-agency cooperation and activity to bring the incident to a safe conclusion. This might be considered the red response. Below it would be an amber response, which varies inasmuch as the threat is authenticated. In an amber response scenario, assessment of all available information and intelligence would generate only reasonable suspicion to justify caution and proportional multiagency response. The ‘standard response’ would be a level below this. For this level of response there is no authentication of the threat, nor does assessment of information and intelligence warrant a full CBRN response. This isn’t a static process and, as events unfold, the levels of response and information change, so must be revisited. A ‘standard’ response also does not equal a lack of care or safe approach – merely a proportional response. Consider otherwise how police forces would deal with the thousands of abandoned bags and packages on transport systems each year. It would be inappropriate to go into the detailed flow charts of the nuances between these levels of response, other than to say that although flow charts may appear linear, one should remember that at any time you may need to ‘jump tracks’ and call forward other resources. You shouldn’t feel unable to ‘reverse’ if more information comes to light. One common need for any incident, regardless of the final determined nature, is a cordon. It is essential that the need for cordons, and the appropriate type of cordon, is identified and implemented as soon as practicable in order to provide a permissive environment for multi-agency responders at a CBRN event, as well as to
44 CBRNe WORLD February 2012 CBRNe South America 2012, 13-14 March, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. More information on
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