I tell you what we want,what we really, really want…
consequent responses to these levels of certainty. This model also takes into account the 50% threshold idea mentioned earlier. I am aware that this model will not fit every conceivable CBRN scenario but it is a way of demonstrating how decision-making may change as certainty of an agent changes.
What is Certainty?
Throughout the research project I focused on levels of certainty and the requirements of responders with regard to certainty versus time. But what is actually meant by certainty? Detection equipment does not display results in levels of percentage certainty. Certainty in this sense is a responder’s belief in the reality of a threat. For this project, asking volunteers to state their required levels of certainty in different scenarios was a effective way to quantify a responder’s requirements for detection equipment and so to establish the point at which they would make critical decisions. In retrospect, perhaps a useful
question would have asked volunteers what they understood by ‘certainty’, as well as how they would interpret changes in certainty.
Summary
Research question 1 asked: What are the key decisions that must be made when responding to a CBRN incident? The responses to this question gave a clear indication of the requirements of CBRN responders. All volunteers stated that the decision to establish the presence/class of agent was their primary concern - everything else is arguably downstream of this. This is a valid point, because it is only after responders have established the type of agent that they are dealing with, that other decisions can be made with any accuracy. For example, donning Level A PPE in response to an unspecified radioactive threat might be seen as a logical decision to make; however, if the radioactive source is a gamma emitter even the best PPE does
nothing to protect responders. This equipment may actually slow responders down, leading to more time spent in the presence of the radiation. So establishing the nature of the agent as quickly as possible is surely the most important decision to be made. According to the study, establishing the concentration levels of the agent involved was the second priority decision.
Perhaps surprisingly, the decision to identify the specific agent is not a requirement to the vast majority of the responders in this study. Research question 2 asked: What information is needed from the detection equipment?
The answer to this was unanimous, with 100% of volunteers stating that they required the detection equipment to indicate the presence and class of agent. Knowing the class of agent is seen as sufficient for first responders. This information allows responders to make urgent decisions that can affect the overall response to a CBRN incident. Volunteers saw little value in knowing the exact identity of the agent. This takes longer to establish and is arguably of little consequence to a protected first responder.
Image 2 Suggested model of response
A proposed model of CBRN response to varying levels of certainty of agent identity. Note, volunteers stated that they would react in an almost identical manner to 10% and 20% certainty - so in this model the response is the same, to continue with DIM. Between 30 – <50% certainty, DIM continues but preparations are being made for a full response. At 50% certainty, as indicated by volunteers in the questionnaire, major decisions would be made, such as evacuation, decontamination and so on. At anything above 50% certainty, there is an argument for treating the situation as a full CBRN response.
Both qualitative and quantitative data from the questionnaire demonstrated that volunteers would respond well before knowing the exact identity of the agent. The second most popular requirement from detection equipment was a need to know the concentration levels of the agent involved. This research is only a small snapshot into CBRN response and decision making. The sample size of volunteers was small, but all were specialist CBRN trained responders from the UK. This research gives an interesting, albeit brief, insight into the requirements of responders and their thought processes when responding to a CBRN incident scene. These protected responders are the front line of CBRN response with the unenviable task of making crucial, rapid decisions, often with very little information – hopefully studies like this will enable better decision making and improved understanding of detector CONOPS.
CBRNe South America 2012, 13-14 March, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. More information on
www.icbrnevents.com 26 CBRNe WORLD February 2012
www.cbrneworld.com
CBRNeWORLD
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