CBRNeWORLD
intelligence for military action, that enables the network to be targeted - rather than individual devices. Search should appeal to the modern military commander as it provides an alternative to kinetic activity for forces seeking to degrade the enemy’s capability. As a result, it continues to be of particular utility in a complex, counterinsurgency environment where more traditional military operations must be balanced against the need for influence and stabilisation. The denial of resources and the gathering of evidence or intelligence are all potential benefits of a coherent and correctly implemented search operation. As a defensive tool, search enhances the protection of friendly forces’ assets. Dependent on the threat and situation, procedures may be scaled from a low level, i.e., ‘camp check’, routines involving a large number of personnel performing basic area search, up to advanced defensive building searches requiring detailed threat assessments, specialist techniques and equipment. Detection of emplaced IEDs is a key component of search and has been highlighted as a critical area for development during recent operations. It must be recognised, however, that the equipment itself forms only part of the capability and other lines of development, such as the training of individuals and the production of coherent doctrine, are all vital to ensure success.
A Scalable Capability
As with other areas of operations, the response to the IED threat by military forces must reflect the situation on the ground. By developing a scalable capability, commanders are able to adopt a ‘golf bag’ approach and force package capabilities to counter specific and developing, operational threats.
If future operations are of a similar nature to Afghanistan then the supply of specialist EOD assets is unlikely to meet demand. Commanders on the ground will still require the ability to defeat the IED threat and therefore a range of capabilities that can counter the threat - given the mission, tempo and resource availability that will be required. Commanders can adapt theatre directives concerned with the detection and subsequent destruction/neutralisation of IEDs to best suit their mission objectives. In effect, they are setting the level of a ‘threat bar’ against the scale of available capabilities. A small number of complex devices can be responded to by highly trained specialists. Should the use of IEDs reach the levels seen in Afghanistan, however, and potentially result in a restriction to friendly forces’ manoeuvrability, and/or a sharp rise in casualties, the commander may elect to actively manage the risk to all personnel. If enough specialist assets are available to manage the IED risk then other non-specialist personnel would not be permitted to conduct IED-related tasks. If the level of the IED threat was significant however, and there were limited specialist assets available to reduce the risk to all personnel, then directives could be adjusted to allow non-specialists to conduct basic IED tasks. This sliding scale approach to managing the IED threat will require a range of capabilities that, as discussed, will span both generalist and specialist personnel.
There is certainly no assertion that the requirement for specialists is decreasing, indeed the uplift in numbers of trained specialists within the British army is testament of the opposite. Wherever there is an IED threat there will be a
www.cbrneworld.com CBRNe South America 2012, 13-14 March, Rio De Janeiro
requirement for advanced level operators - both in the fields of search and other disciplines. These operators may be tasked to work with the most dangerous of situations and also to anticipate and adapt to emerging threats.
Outside the Military
There has traditionally been a correlation between the military and police with regards to search training and procedures. Police search is an essential tool in counter-terrorism, particularly as the last decade, and has seen a significant rise and shift in terrorist and extremist methods of attack. As the threat of terrorism clearly exists outside of the military environment, it is logical that many of the lessons learnt on operations may be applied elsewhere. The attacks on the World Trade Centre (2001), London Underground (2007), Madrid train network (2004) and in Norway (2011), demonstrate the lengths that terrorists and extremists will go to in order to achieve their aims. The application of search within the commercial sector is also an area that presents opportunities, whether it be awareness training for personnel at a large scale event such as the Olympic Games or as a higher level of search procedure instruction delivered to security guards or security managers in stadiums, shopping centres or other mass public gathering venues. Broadly mirroring the scalable range of capabilities that are being adopted by the military, managers may choose to provide low-level, counter -threat awareness training to all staff, with an enhanced capability rolled out to security personnel, in order for organisations and individuals to plan, prepare and protect themselves from a range of threats.
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