PANSTADIA & ARENA MANAGEMENT WINTER 2013/14


Securing major events


Andrew Amery, point man for the Metropolitan Police in the London Olympic Games Organising Committee, refl ects on today’s venue security issues.


A


ndrew Amery has just spent a decade on the Olympic project in


London. He was involved in putting the bid together and worked in various roles for the Metropolitan Police, eventually being seconded to the London Olympic Games Organising Committee and at Games time working as Head of Security Co-ordination. He is now working as a consultant.


What was the most important lesson learned from London 2012?


Integration. Security touched every department including the ticketing, logistics and the design of the stadiums. We ran a trusted third-party suppliers programme, certifying the security of their offsite warehouses so that vehicles could move in and out of the event site at all hours pre-checked.


A scheme known as ‘secured by design’, handled by the Association of Chief Police Offi cers in the UK ensures counter terrorist and crime prevention issues are considered from the outset. Its implementation resulted, for example, in a particular type of construction for the velodrome, to mitigate the potential threats from the local road network, which ran close to the venue.


Could you take into account the temporary nature of the Games?


Yes, we considered how much of the kit was usable in legacy when deciding on purchase or rental. For a Wembley, it makes sense to invest in technology that will contribute long-term.


For a temporary multi-sport site, you need to rent additional technology for a six to eight week period. The supplier should take some of the risk. We worked with Rapiscan for the screening and they


138 interview andrew amery


can now take the equipment forward to Glasgow 2014 and Rio 2016, together with the major event experience they have amassed.


London’s security staffi ng hit a snag. Any advice?


We had a mix of police, private security (including military who stepped in to help) stewards and volunteers. The key is to have clear roles for each.


The UK’s Green Guide specifi es the ratio of stewards to spectators. Then you can add volunteers to that mix, who can have a more crowd engagement/ spectator experience role.


However, the best advice is to understand the private sector’s capability to provide the paid security workforce. We knew back in 2006 that the UK security industry did not have the numbers required, so we embarked upon the Bridging the Gap initiative. This trained a lot of stewards and security staff in local education establishments prior to the Games, many of whom have gone on to work in the sector.


Additionally there was signifi cant training in CCTV operation, searching and screening which are in addition to the standard licencing requirements.


Getting the mix of staff right at the entrances is important. The volunteers can meet and greet, which leaves the trained/licenced security staff free to do the physical search and to operate the screening equipment.


Are the public happy with the current levels of security?


Search and pat-down policies are a matter of risk assessment, including the type of crowd coming to the event. The modern day spectator visiting a venue expects to be searched properly.


Boston demonstrated the vulnerability of crowded places to a person- borne bomb.


Visitors want to be searched quickly. We aimed for a 20 minute maximum queue at the Olympics. We averaged seven minutes. Some sports, like tennis or cricket, have the slow build-up typical of an Olympic park. Football however has fans turning up in the last 40 minutes or less so you have to be aware of the particular crowd dynamics when developing your search strategies.


How did you plan for the terrorist threat?


We decided to plan our security posture for the London Olympics at the second highest threat level (the UK has fi ve levels). The higher the level, the more expensive it is but we decided it was easier to ease down from level two than to ramp up to level two.


What is different about an Olympics?


At a Games, the world comes to you and you need to engage with all international groups. The teams from the USA or Russia or Australia have different views on security and you need their support and engagement.


The same can be said in regard to the sponsors who will want to ensure their brand is not tarnished in any way. A different host country, say Qatar, will have a completely different cultural approach and perception of threat.


So it’s important to discuss security issues well ahead of the events and develop a clear strategy several years in advance. In Brazil the perception is that the main security issue will be crime, not terrorism, but with the world arriving in Rio the terrorism risks will increase and need to be planned for. 


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