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CBRN War crimes by proxy


There is some reason to fear the lessons Russia has learned through its proxy wars, such as in Syria. While the Syrian civil war began all the way back in 2011, direct Russian involvement only came into play in 2015. Since then, however, the conflict has seen considerable use of what Hamish de Bretton-Gordon would call “unconventional violence”. “In Syria, one of the key aspects was using chemical weapons against civilians,” the former UK and Nato commander of CBRN forces notes. “And General [Sergei] Surovikin, who’s the leader of Russian forces in Ukraine, was a key part of the architecture and design of that.”


And while Russia, to date, has so far held off from using targeted CBRN weaponry on Ukrainian forces or civilians, it has certainly shown its willingness to target civilians through conventional means. Currently, there is considerable concern over how Russia has been targeting Ukrainian infrastructure, including several factories containing toxic chemicals in the north and south of the country.


Back in 2016, the Islamic State launched an attack on the Al-Mishraq sulphur plant in northern Iraq, setting fire to the complex. At the time, de Bretton- Gordon was serving as the chemical weapons advisor for the Peshmerga – the military forces of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Toxic fumes from the burning plant cut across the advancing Iraqi army, inflicting casualties and creating confusion. Two civilians died and nearly a thousand people were treated for toxic gas inhalation. Approximately 161,000t of sulphur dioxide was released over seven days – equivalent to a small volcanic eruption. “Fortuitously, the downwind hazards of those chemical weapons have not been realised,” de Bretton-Gordon notes, regarding the attacks on Ukrainian industry. “If that was what the Russians were trying to do by bombing these chemical facilities, that hadsn’t happened.” This is notable, however, due to recurring Russian claims of dirty bombs and false flag chemical attacks – before Putin’s accusations, a Russian Ministry of Defence briefing claimed that Ukrainian forces had blown up a tank of fertiliser in the Kharkiv region to accuse Russia of using chemical weapons. Similarly, Russia has claimed that the US and the UK have been developing biological weapons at three sites within Ukraine. All three parties involved have vocally denounced these accusations, and denied any involvement in biological weapon development of any kind. Russia, on the other hand, is well-known to have a biological weapons programme in the works.


Going nuclear


The biggest CBRN threats facing Ukraine, however, are radiological and nuclear, according to de Bretton- Gordon. There has been considerable talk and coverage


on the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons, but while the Russians do have access to about 2,000 such warheads, any attempt at using them would cause more problems than they could ever solve. A British intelligence briefing in November 2022 stated that Russian forces appear to be replacing nuclear warheads with conventional ones in their cruise missiles. Not only does this demonstrate that Russia is running out of precision weapons, it also shows that British and American intelligence are keeping close tabs on Russia’s tactical nuclear forces. As a result, if Russia ever did consider using a tactical nuclear weapon, Nato would likely be able to take the threat out conventionally ahead of time. Similarly, any such attempt would be all but certain to lead to Nato’s direct involvement in the war, which Russia has taken great steps to avoid up to now – though de Bretton-Gordon expects that any nuclear aggression by Russian would be met by conventional means, rather than any kind of nuclear exchange. With an improvised nuclear weapon, or a dirty bomb, however, these considerations are not at play – more importantly, any such attack would be deniable, making it difficult for Nato to justify entering the war as a direct response.


In recent months, Putin has stated his intent to power Ukraine down – seeking to switch off the lights and heating for the country in the middle of winter. The assault carried out on Ukrainian power infrastructure has been very successful to date, with millions of Ukrainians currently forced to go without power. These attacks are particularly concerning as – prior to the war – 54% of Ukraine’s energy supply came from nuclear power stations. The largest nuclear power plant in Europe, Zaporizhzhia, has been under Russian control for almost the entirety of the conflict. It is no longer producing power onto the grid – it does, however, have six active nuclear reactors. The plant has come under shelling during the conflict, leading to a lot of finger-pointing from both


Defence & Security Systems International / www.defence-and-security.com


The cooling towers of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station in Ukraine, currently held by Russian forces.


54%


power stations. Reuters


41


The percentage of Ukraine’s pre-war energy supply that came from nuclear


Ihor Bondarenko/Shutterstock.com


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