Air systems
Taken aback at how quickly unmanned aerial systems (UASs) have changed the battlefield, armies have been slow to adapt. And while some tactics have proved effective at diluting the airborne threat – with kill counts to match – truly effective counter-UAS (CUAS) strategies can only come about through close collaboration across military forces. Even then, staff officers and their colleagues in the field will need to keep an eye on the sky, as the enemy fights to mitigate the impact of CUAS on their operations.
Droning on
Beyond the obvious – an unarmed child taking on enemy armour and living to tell the tale – Pokrasa’s story is perhaps most amazing for the drone he actually used. Far from being a piece of high-tech equipment, he used a simple civilian machine – the sort hobbyists can buy for just $300. That alone has transformed the influence of drones over the skies of Eastern Europe, with both Russia and Ukraine using thousands of off- the-shelf devices to help with reconnaissance. That’s shadowed by more sophisticated equipment too. As far as Kyiv is concerned, probably their most ferocious aerial weapon is the Bayraktar TB2, made by Turkey and often carrying laser-guided bombs. Russia, for its part, boasts so-called ‘kamikaze’ drones that smash directly into Ukrainian positions.
But if those are the drones – which Ukrainian intelligence sources claim have helped dispatch 70 Russian tanks since the start of the war – what can be done to stop them? The answer, says Riki Ellison, chairman and founder at the Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, encompasses an overlapping set of systems. A favourite tactic involves jammers, blocking a drone’s radio frequencies and preventing the operator from flying it. Though not cheap, Ellison says this approach will soon see UASs “dropping like flies”. From there, he spotlights a number of more active technologies. That covers everything from firing mini-drones into the sky, physically hitting enemy UASs, to zapping at offending machines with lasers. Given all these techniques, Ellison is optimistic that drones have little to fear from CUAS. “The problem,” he says, “has been solved.” To a certain extent, Ellison’s confidence is borne out by the facts. According to one July report, Putin’s army lost 600 drones in the five months after hostilities began. But speak to other experts and the situation becomes rather more muddled. “We have observed, at least on our side, that there is a lot of marketing going on,” argues Dr Cristian Coman, lead for counter drone activities at the NCI Agency, Nato’s technology and cyber centre. “But there are very few capabilities that really are effective and really do what they claim.” Certainly, Coman’s point makes sense if you follow the Ukraine war closely. To give one example, a clip that did the rounds on social media in 2022 showed a drone dropping a bomb right through the hatch of an unsuspecting
Russian tank. Quite apart from the explosion’s devastating accuracy, that such an attack could happen eight months into the war hints at the limited effectiveness of much of CUAS technology. More to the point, Coman stresses that there are a range of technical problems with many anti-drone platforms. That starts, he says, with jamming. If the would-be jammer is further from the drone than the device’s controller, Coman explains, it risks the latter winning out in the battle for control. Even more fundamental, he adds, is the fact that many drones are autonomous. That means they could still cause chaos – finding foes and dealing damage – even if the operator is unable to fly it. Similar difficulties stalk alternative CUAS systems too. Lasers, for instance, don’t always work in smoky conditions. Given the average battlefield, that’s hardly ideal.
A serviceman holds an anti-drone rifl e as part of a presentation in Kyiv, capital of Ukraine.
“There is a lot of marketing going on. But there are very few capabilities that really are effective and really do what they claim.”
Dr Cristian Coman Net growth
Amid the shifting fronts and bloody fights, one recent story from Ukraine sticks out. At the end of May, just as the defenders at the blasted Mariupol steelworks finally surrendered, Fortem Technologies, a US-based tech company, announced it was sending the country some help. Known as SkyDomes, these devices are built to disable enemy drones – but unlike many other CUAS systems, they don’t use fancy lasers and jamming equipment. On the contrary, Fortem’s machines rely on something far simpler. Soaring into the air, they fire nets at approaching drones, tangling them up and causing them to crash. Faced with smaller drones, a SkyDome can even drag their prey, hound-like, back home to their operator.
Defence & Security Systems International /
www.defence-and-security.com
$17bn
The predicted value of the international market for military
drones by 2027. GlobalData
23
Drop of Light/
Shutterstock.com
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