SAFE T Y Conclusions
During the investigation into the very serious marine casualty involving the fishing vessel FREYJA, it was not possible to determine the cause of the fire. Nevertheless, important findings were made or those from previous investigations confirmed, which can serve as a basis for safety recommendations.
Fire protection/firefighting – survey procedures of BG Verkehr (DS)
It is generally known that in addition to the improper execution of welding operations and self-ignition of cargo, technical faults in electrical systems or cabling, battery problems and self-ignition of propellants or lubricants due to contact with hot surfaces are all possible causes of fire on board a ship. In addition to the requisite special care during periodic inspections, maintenance and competent repair of hazardous systems and equipment on board, the survey procedures of BG Verkehr (DS) play a central role, especially with regard to the safety of fishing vessels.
Over the course of their service life, which often spans many decades, some of these vessels have undergone various changes of ownership. Accordingly, but also because of changing regulations and standards, various structural changes and technical modifications are inevitably made on fishing vessels over the years. Past investigations of the BSU have repeatedly confirmed that these have unfortunately not always been carried out with the necessary care and expertise. Moreover, it is not always possible to readily identify any technical deficiencies or their wear-induced development on a ship.
Performing surveys on and issuing safety certificates for coastal fishing vessels of less than 24 metres in length During the (periodical) surveys of the ship’s safety installations and equipment, surveyors from the BG Verkehr (DS) should pay particular attention to the fire hazard posed by technical installations. The same applies to the existence and proper state of operation and maintenance of portable and permanently installed fire extinguishing equipment. If deficiencies are identified, the safety certificate should initially be issued only on a provisional and temporary basis. The safety certificate should not be allowed to have its full official effect up to the normal expiry date until it is demonstrated (by follow-up survey or the provision of other supporting documents) that all safety- related deficiencies have been rectified within the time limit.
Download the report at
https://bit.ly/3T6rjLd.
Briefings
Accidental discharge of condensed aerosol fire-extinguishing system on beam trawler Resurgam report issued
On 15 November 2019, an apprentice engineer died when a FirePro condensed aerosol fire-extinguishing system was inadvertently activated in the engine room of the fishing vessel Resurgam (PZ1001) as it was being installed. The apprentice engineer together with a shore engineer and two installation technicians were working in the engine room when the system activated, filling the engine room with the fire-extinguishing aerosol.
Safety issues – The fire-extinguishing aerosol was hazardous to health when inhaled in significant quantities and these hazards were not identified in the manufacturer’s safety related information
– The installation of the fire-extinguishing system had not been properly planned or risk mitigation measures put in place to protect people working in the space
– There was ineffective oversight at both the system design and installation stages and no standards for marine installers: this contrasted with the framework for land-based installations of the same product
Recommendations – The Maritime and Coastguard Agency has been recommended (2023/116) to take steps to improve fire-extinguishing system installation standards.
– FirePro has been recommended (2023/117 and 2023/118) to undertake a specific risk assessment for the installation and operation of each of its fire-extinguishing systems; and, to review its safety-related documentation and incorporate all of the system’s hazards, specifically carbon monoxide production.
– The owner of Resurgam has been recommended (2023/119) to revise its safety management system to ensure that personnel safety measures are in place.
Download the MAIB pdf report at
https://bit.ly/3Sa24FY. 26 | ISSUE 107 | MAR 2024 | THE REPORT
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