SAFE T Y
Briefings
As his attempts to arrest the leak by further tightening the bolt of the housing with a spanner were unsuccessful, he used a pipe for added leverage on the spanner to tighten the bolt even further. Observing that the leak had now stopped, the second engineer wiped off the spilled oil that had collected below and left the engine-room. He proceeded to the ECR to switch the engine-room to UMS mode and then to inform the chief engineer about the leak during dinner time in the mess room.
At 1730, however, just as the second engineer arrived in the ECR, the fire alarm activated for the engine-room. At about this time, the second engineer also observed a low- pressure alarm for the main engine’s cylinder unit no. 2, on the ECR control panel. Opening the door to the engine- room, he saw high flames and dense smoke rising from cylinder unit no. 2. He shut the door and ran back to the ECR, while raising a verbal alarm on the fire.
Cause of the fire on board MV Mona
Based on the crew members’ narratives and the observed fire pattern, the safety investigation concluded that the fire was caused by a spray of fuel oil from the region of the main engine’s cylinder units nos. 1 to 3 onto hot surfaces in the vicinity. As mentioned earlier in this safety investigation report, the main engine’s manual specified a torque of 130 Nm for the tightening of the housing bolts. The second engineer had used a spanner with a pipe for extra leverage to tighten the bolt from where he observed an oil leak. He had no indication as to the torque being applied to further tighten the bolt.
Although the damaged threads of the bolt suggested failure due to over tightening, the safety investigation requested the Company to provide it with the broken bolt for the purposes of laboratory tests. These tests would have assisted the safety investigation to determine the cause(s) for the breakage of the bolt. However, the Company advised the MSIU that the broken bolt was held by the vessel’s insurers and was therefore unavailable.
The denied access to the broken bolt not only has compromised a detailed analysis of the failure mechanism of the bolt but prohibited it altogether. To this effect, the MSIU was unable to contribute towards a technical analysis and therefore on how the repeat of such an accident can be prevented.
In view of the above, the safety investigation can only suggest that the applied extra torque may have exceeded that specified in the manual and resulted in the failure of the bolt.
Fishing vessel FREYJA: Report released by BSU after fire in engine compartment
The German Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU) has published an accident report following a fire that broke out in the engine compartment of the German fishing vessel FREYJA on the evening of 17 September 2021.
The fire on board the fishing vessel FREYJA resulted in the destruction of most of the boat. The fire-induced foundering of the vessel made it impossible to identify usable evidence of the cause of the fire or the exact starting point of its development during the investigation of the wrecked parts. The statements of the crew merely permit the conclusion that the fire broke out inside the engine compartment. Possible causes include battery problems (excessive release of explosive oxyhydrogen gas into the atmosphere of the warm and poorly ventilated engine compartment), contact of lubricant or fuel with hot surfaces, defective insulation of heat-conducting engine components or even a short circuit in the electrical cabling.
In particular, the fact that cabling, conventionally encased in plastic, ran inside the bilge of the fishing vessel with no special additional protection was a risk factor. The insulation of the cables in the bilge was naturally exposed to the chemical influences of the oil and water mixture found there. In this respect, it cannot be ruled out that there has been an undetected degradation of the layers of insulation over the years, subsequently leading to a short circuit that caused the fire.
THE REPORT | MAR 2024 | ISSUE 107 | 25
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