Supplement to The Naval Architect International Journal of The Royal Institution of Naval Architects


WARSHIP TECHNOLOGY Editor David Foxwell


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4 News 11 T-Craft - ONR seeks ‘transformable’ connector 17 Russians planning fleet replacement 38 Third K130 corvette launched 40 UK Royal Navy completes S2C2 ‘Pathfinder’ study 42 Electromagnetic launcher for UAVs tested 43 Intrepid disposal strategy identified 44 New Riverine craft developed 46 Sealion provides basis for fast craft testing 48 New RAS equipment being developed by Rolls-Royce 50 HMNZS Canterbury goes on trials 52 Fuel cells examined in METHAPU project 54 Royal Netherlands Navy in transition 56 Navy League 2007 a muted affair 59 Danish Navy to get new frigates 60 New naval applications for NAPA


Disarray in US naval shipbuilding


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AVAL shipbuilders in the US have been taking a hammering in recent weeks, and deservedly so. In April, the Secretary of the Navy, Donald C Winter announced that the Department of the Navy


was to terminate construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship (LCS 3) for convenience, under the ter- mination clause of the contract, because the US Navy and Lockheed Martin could not reach agreement on the terms of a modified contract. The US Navy issued a stop-work order on construction of LCS 3 in January, following a series of cost


over-runs on LCS 1 and projection of cost increases on LCS 3, which are being built by Lockheed Martin under a cost-plus contract. Then, in March, the US Navy announced that it would consider lifting the stop-work order on LCS 3 if it


and Lockheed Martin could agree on the terms for a fixed price incentive agreement by mid-April. ‘The US Navy worked closely with Lockheed Martin to try to restructure the agreement for LCS 3 to


more equitably balance cost and risk, but could not come to terms and conditions that were acceptable to both parties,’ said the Navy in a statement, noting that it remains committed to completing construction of LCS 1 under the current contract with Lockheed Martin. (LCS 2 and 4 are under contract with General Dynamics, and the US Navy said it plans to monitor their cost performance closely). The US Navy also intends to continue with a plan to assess costs and capabilities of LCS 1 and LCS 2,


and transition to a single seaframe configuration in fiscal year 2010 after an operational assessment and considering all relevant factors, and General Dynamics’ ships will continue on a cost-plus basis as long as its costs remain defined and manageable. If the cost performance becomes unacceptable, however, then General Dynamics will be subject to similar restructuring requirements. ‘LCS continues to be a critical warfighting requirement for our Navy to maintain dominance in the


littorals and strategic choke points around the world,’ said Winter. ‘While this is a difficult decision, we recognise that active oversight and strict cost controls in the early years are necessary to ensuring we can deliver these ships to the fleet over the long term.’ Unfortunately, LCS is far from being the only US Navy/Coast Guard shipbuilding programme to have


been the subject of major criticism in recent months. The saga surrounding the construction and non-intro- duction into service of the first LPD-17, San Antonio, is another, not forgetting ongoing investigations into severe technical problems with US Coast Guard programmes. In April, the Coast Guard announced that it plans to take ‘direct control’ of the US Coast Guard’s Deep-


water programme, something that several commentators said it should have done right back at the begin- ning, in the 1990s. ‘In the meantime, the phrase ‘waste and abuse’ continues to fly around and there is talk of criminal prosecutions,’ noted one well known commentator on US construction programmes, Tim Colton. As Colton, a well known management consultant with getting on for 50 years of experience in the


shipbuilding industry wrote recently of the LPD-17 fiasco: ‘After costing US$400 million more than was budgeted and almost five years after the original contract delivery date, the LPD-17 still doesn't work.’ ‘Now this white elephant has to go into BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair for three months and US$36


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January - December 2006


million of fixes. Is this a disgrace, or what? What’s the betting that this ship will never actually be opera- tional but will be turned into some kind of training vessel or experimental platform, with an IX designa- tion,’ wrote Colton, noting that ‘reliable sources’ say that LPD-18 - which was delivered in December - is in even worse shape, and has been stuck in Pensacola for over a month, with inoperable steering gear. ‘How about terminating this contract, Secretary Winter? And for cause, not for convenience. What was that about no more blank checks?’ Colton wrote. Speaking at the US Navy Sea Air Space exhibition in April – by all accounts an extremely muted affair


ISSN 0957-5537 WARSHIP TECHNOLOGY MAY 2007


– Winter criticised shipbuilders in the US and pledged to sort out the many problems facing the industry through what he called a policy of ‘tough love.’


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CONTENTS MAY 2007


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