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PARK SECURITY


SITE AND TOPOGRAPHY The topography of many theme parks makes it easy for the terrorist to move quickly and unseen, and there are a wide range of permutations which can cause barriers to resilience. These comprise a plethora of places to use as cover, lack of deterrents including CCTV, high level search protocols or visible security access to key positions for an attack going unchallenged. By focusing on the total experience


Best practice for the prevention of terrorist attacks at theme parks and attractions


heme parks and amusement parks are a soft target for any terrorist or active shooter attack, writes


Professor Chris Kemp. Here he offers advice to prevent everyone's worst nightmare spoiling a family day out.


As venues, theme parks comprise several major aspects which lend themselves to


32


Be safe! T


they offer to guests, parks often reduce the level of resilience. Front end deterrents tend to be covert rather than overt and it is this balance which needs to be addressed to ensure that the covert becomes the alert. Once on site, the terrorist or active shooter is in an enclosed area which is gated and very often ringed by a fence. This makes it hard for escape and running to a turnstile may cause congestion which could attract maximum collateral damage. However, the theme park is often large with many places to hide and call for assistance, which helps those in difficulty.


QUEUING AND SEARCH PROTOCOLS


reduced resilience. These include large groups of static attendees in one place, a transport hub close by, a strong internal wayfinding and communication network, an isolated fenced or barriered area and a wide audience demographic. In this article, we will not be focusing on vehicle attacks but those from a person borne perspective and active shooter (firearm) delivery.


It is clear from recent intelligence that the queue; either internal or external, is a legitimate target for the terrorist, and theme parks are renowned for queues. Queues to get in, to get out, for rides, concessions, toilets, transport etc. The management of queues is key and those managing them and the technologies associated with their management and safety need to be a focal point throughout the customer experience to facilitate escape.


The placement of concessions, the


delivery of clear wayfinding (signage etc.) and the management of queues are both positive and negative elements for the


PARK WORLD Handbook & Buyers Guide 2017


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