ample authority on both sides of the ques- tion.6
The district court proceeded to ana- lyze the issue from an evidentiary standpoint. Fed. R. Evid. 401 defines relevant evidence as that which has any tendency to make the existence of any fact “that is of consequence to the action” more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.7
Relying on the
Commentary to Rule 401, the district court rejected the argument commonly made by parties seeking to impose a stipu- lation that a stipulated fact is no longer at issue and, as a result, of no consequence to the action:
The fact to which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute. While situations arise which call for the exclusion of evidence offered to prove a point conceded by an op- ponent, the ruling should be made on the basis of such considerations as waste of time and undue preju- dice [Rule 403], rather than under any general requirement that evi- dence is admissible only if directed to matters in dispute.8
6
Id. at 372 (comparing J. F. Edwards Construc- tion Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 1325 (7th Cir. 1976)(Rule 16 “does not compel a stipula- tion of facts”); 6A Charles A. Wright, FED- ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1525.1 at 252-53 (2d ed. 1990)(observing there is a serious issue regarding the court’s power to order a stipulation), with Holcomb v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 255 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1958); Brinn v. Bull Insular Lines, 28 F.R.D. 578 (D. Pa. 1961); United States v. AT&T, 83 F.R.D. 323, 332 n. 18 (D.D.C. 1979)(Rule 16 contemplates that the Court may compel parties to stipulate as to all mat- ters concerning which there can be no real dispute.”).
7 Fed. R. Evid. 401. 8
Briggs, 174 F.R.D. at 372. In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, (1997), the criminal defendant offered to stipulate to the prior conviction element of unlawful pos- session of a firearm, i.e., that he had a previ- ous felony conviction. The State refused to join the stipulation and presented a full record of the prior judgment for assault caus- ing bodily injury. Id. at 175. The United States Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion when it rejected the defendant’s offer to concede a prior judg- ment when the name or nature of the prior offense raised the risk of a tainted verdict and when the purpose of the evidence was solely to prove the fact of prior conviction where that is an element of the crime with which he is charged. Id. at 184-185. As a thresh- old matter, it rejected the defendant’s argu- ment that the name of the prior offense was
Summer 2003 Trial Reporter 7
Rule 403, on the other hand, vested
“great authority in the trial judge to ex- clude evidence which is relevant under Rule 401, and ordinarily admissible un- der Rule 402, if its ‘probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or be consider- ations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi- dence.’”9
This authority, the district court
urged, was also evident in Rule 104 (a), permitting the trial judge to address pre- liminary questions of evidence, and Rule
inadmissible as irrelevant because of the pro- posed stipulation. It concluded, as did the district court in Briggs, that “If…relevant evidence is inadmissible in the presence of other evidence related to it, its exclusion must not rest on the ground that other evidence has rendered it ‘irrelevant’ [under Fed. R. Evid 401, 402], but on its character as un- fairly prejudicial, cumulative or the like [un- der Fed. R. Evid. 403] its relevance notwith- standing.” Id. at 179. The United States Supreme Court explained that that the trial judge must make such Rule 403 calculations “with an appreciation of the offering party’s need for evidentiary richness and narrative integrity in presenting a case, and the mere fact that two pieces of evidence go to the same point would not, of course, necessarily mean that only one of them might come in. It would only mean that a judge applying Rule 403 could reasonably apply some dis- count to the probative value of an item of evidence when faced with less risky alterna- tive proof going to the same point.” 519 U.S. at 183. Rule 403 analysis should not view the evidence as an “island, with esti- mates of its own probative value and unfairly prejudicial risk the sole reference points in deciding whether the danger substantially
611 (a), requiring it to “exercise reason- able control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interroga- tion and presentation effective for the ascertainment of truth, [and] (2) avoid needless consumption of time[.]”10
Thus,
while there might be doubt as to whether the trial court has the authority to order involuntary acceptance of a stipulation under the Federal Rules of Procedure, there was “no real dispute” that the trial
(Continued on page 8)
outweighs the value and whether the evi- dence ought to be excluded.” Id. at 182. Rather, admissibility must be considered in the “full evidentiary context of the case[.]” Id. at 182, 184. If a particular piece of evi- dence raised the danger of unfair prejudice, the trial court “would go on to evaluate the degrees of probative value and unfair preju- dice not only for the item in question but for any actually available substitutes as well.” Id. at 183. Even under this approach, the Supreme Court explained, a defendant’s “Rule 403 objection offering to concede a point generally cannot prevail over the government’s choice to offer evidence show- ing guilt and all the circumstances surround- ing the offense.” Id. On this last point, see also Daniels v. United States, 738 A.2d 240, 249-50, 253 (D.C. 1999)(trial court did not err in admitting testimony of medical exam- iner and autopsy photographs instead of re- quiring government to accept stipulation; except in extremely limited circumstances, “a party may not be forced to accept a stipu- lation in lieu of testimonial or tangible evi- dence[.]”)
9 Fed. R. Evid. 403. 10Fed. R. Evid. 611 (a).
11Briggs,174 F.R.D. at 373 n.5.
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56