A Pale Stipulation (Continued from page 9)
[I]f allowed as intended by the de- fendant, its waiver would prevent the jury from learning any facts about its alleged liability, while shifting almost the entire focus of the trial to the intimate details of the plaintiff’s life. As noted by the court in Merchant v. Lymon, 828 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), per- mitting the waiver to block all evidence of defendant’s alleged li- ability would strip the plaintiff’s case of “much of its fair and legiti- mate weight.”
The trial court cautioned, however,
that in ruling on the admissibility of evi- dence at trial, it would, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403, determine whether the de- fendant contested the issue toward which the evidence was directed.
It remained It cannot seriously
be disputed that the difference be- tween proceeding with the waiver, as opposed to allowing the plain- tiff to prove her liability case, would deprive the plaintiff of the “moral force” of some of her most impor- tant evidence. To do this, while at the same time allowing the case to almost exclusively focus on the most personal details of the plaintiff ’s background, simply would be unfair.19
18Id. 19Id. at 375-376.
the court’s function to prevent the jury from being sidetracked by evidence which was cumulative, or which otherwise dis- tracted the juries from matters truly in dispute.20 Stipulations can work to the benefit of both parties, and further serve the goal of judicial economy. They can and should be entered into where possible. Yet plaintiff’s counsel should carefully con- sider acceptance of any stipulation that might deprive the case of its moral zest
20
Id. at 376. See also City of Cleveland v. The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 538 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1981)(in antitrust action, pretrial exclusion of City’s evidence pertaining to events antedating statutory limitations period and conduct protected under Noerr-Pennington doctrin based on electric utility’s admission, which allegedly eliminated from action issue of monopolis- tic intent, was premature in that admission was not so plenary in nature and sdcope as to render the City’s proposed evidence wholly needless under the circumstances).
by precluding other, more powerful evi- dence. When Plaintiff’s counsel opposes the proposed stipulation, the trial court’s assessment of the impact of a proposed stipulation should be informed by the sen- sible parameters laid down by Judge Grimm in Briggs.
For a discussion of
analogous decisions of Maryland’s Court of Appeals, see Section II.
II. The Joint Stipulation of Fact and Other Proof of the Fact Stipulated
Under Maryland law, a “stipulation”
is an agreement between the parties akin to a contract. Stipulations are based on mutual assent and, like contracts, are in- terpreted so as to effectuate the parties’ intentions.21
By definition, then, a “stipu-
lation” is neither unilateral nor coerced. The effect of a true joint stipulation is ordinarily that one party need not offer evidence to prove the fact stipulated and the other party is not allowed to disprove the fact.22
accept a “joint” stipulation under all cir- cumstances.23
21
Ragin v. Porter Hayden Co., 133 Md. App. 116, 754 A.2d 503, cert. denied, 361 Md. 232, 760 A.2d 1107 (2000).
22
Vander Linden v. Hodges, 193 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 1999). See also Varga v. Rockwell Inter- national Corp., 242 F. 3d 393 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 53.
23
Some courts have held that otherwise bind- ing stipulations of fact can be set aside if they can demonstrate a “manifest injustice” would result. Weston v. WMATA, 78 F.3d 682, modified, 86 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Pyles v. Boeing Co., 187 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (D. Kan. 2002); Epstein v. Kalin-Miller International, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Under this standard, a stipulation may not be disregarded whenever substantial contra- dicting evidence is introduced; it may, how- ever, be considered as a factor, albeit the least compelling one, in assessing whether a re- fusal to modify the stipulation would result in substantial injustice. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. , 71 F. Supp. 2d 394 (D. N.J. 1999). Some courts have held that the stage at which a party re- quests relief from a stipulation is an impor- tant factor in determining whether relief should be given from a stipulation, using a “manifest injustice” standard when the party waits until trial to seek relief. On the other hand, a lesser showing of “good reason” for relief has been permitted when the request is made before there has been significant prejudice to other parties, the relief promotes important equitable and legal considerations, and there is no controlling rule of procedure. In re Durability, Inc., 212 F.3d 551 (10th Cir. 2000).
10 Trial Reporter Summer 2003
But the trial court need not First, the parties may not,
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56