Product Liability Update (Continued from page 5)
such a defense.25 It remanded the action
to the Circuit Court to resolve the ques- tion whether the fire was caused by alterations or modifications to the truck after Ford sold it.26 The Court of Appeals granted Ford’s
Petition for certiorari to consider the ques- tions: (1) whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that proof of a product defect is not required to sustain a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (2) whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that General Accident made out a claim for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose where the “par- ticular purpose” of the product was alleged to be the same as its ordinary purpose.27
25
Id. at 332-33, 779 A.2d at 368-69 (citing In- ternational Motors, 133 Md. App. at 277, 754 A.2d at 1119).
26
Id. at 332-33, 779 A.2d at 369 (referring to International Motors, 133 Md. App. at 277, 754 A.2d at 1119).
27
Ford Motor, 365 Md. at 323-24, 779 A.2d at 363.
“AMFS
The Court of Appeals rejected the
Court of Special Appeals’ determination that a specific product defect was not re- quired to maintain a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.28 The Court of Appeals was unimpressed by the absence of any reference in the implied warranty provisions of the Com- mercial Code to the words “defect” or “defective” conditions, chastising the Court of Special Appeals for “maintain- ing, without citation, that ‘Maryland case law does not require proof of a defect.’”29 It saw nothing in the language of the Maryland statute to support any intent to release plaintiffs of their evidentiary burdens of production or persuasion.30
In
support of its determination that proof of a defect is necessary for a claim of breach of implied warranty of merchant- ability, the Court of Appeals relied on a series of decisions in which Maryland’s appellate courts have indicated that proof of a product defect at the time it left the
Cairns Pontiac32 In Harrison,33
manufacturer’s control is required irre- spective of the theory of recovery.31 The Court found Harrison v. Bill most “factually similar.” the plaintiffs had purchased
a 1978 Mercury Zephyr with 58,855 miles on the odometer from the defen- dant, a Pontiac dealership.34
Fire ignited
either within or behind the instrument panel on the dash less than a year after the plaintiffs bought the used vehicle.35 The plaintiffs’ expert testified that the fire was caused by an electrical short circuit occurring behind the instrument cluster based on a determination that this was the only triggering event that could have caused this fire in the area of origin.36 Another expert opined that the fire was a result of a defect in the electrical system, although he was unable to identify spe- cifically what that defect was.37
In
28Id. at 333, 779 A.2d 369-70. 29Id. at 333, 779 A.2d at 369. 30Id.
Harrison, the Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on behalf of the manufacturer as to all counts, noting that expert testi- mony that an electrical fire would not normally result in the absence of a prod- uct defect was not sufficient to allow the inference of a product defect in a five-year old vehicle with such mileage.38
Harrison
had held the plaintiffs must present evi- dence sufficient for a jury to infer that the
31
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34 35 36 37 38
Id. at 333-38, 779 A.2d at 369-72 (relying on Hacker v. Shofer, 251 Md. 672, 676-77, 248 A.2d 351, 354 (1968); Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 273 Md. 592, 608-09, 332 A.2d 1, 10 (1975); Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, 77 Md. App. 41, 50, 549 A.2d 385, 390 (1988)).
3277 Md. App. 41, 549 A.2d 385 (1988). 33
In contrast to Ford Motor, Harrison was a suit for personal injury damages. Id. at 45, 549 A.2d 385.
Ford Motor, 365 Md. at 371, 779 A.2d at 371 (citing Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 43, 549 A.2d at 387).
Id. at 336, 779 A.2d at 370-71 (citing Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 44, 549 A.2d at 387).
Id. at 336, 779 A.2d at 371 (citing Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 44, 549 A.2d at 387).
Id. (citing Harrison, 77 Md. App. 45-47, 549 A.2d at 387-88).
Id. at 336-37, 779 A.2d at 371-72 (citing Harrison, 77 Md. App. 51-53, 549 A.2d at 390-91). In Ford Motor, the Court of Ap- peals cited the longstanding proposition that an inference of a defect may be drawn from the happening of an accident where circum- stantial evidence tends to eliminate other causes such as product alteration or misuse. Id. at 337, 779 A.2d at 371. In particular, it noted that various factors should be consid-
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