The case proceeded to a bench trial un- der claims of negligence, express warranty, implied warranty of merchantability, im- plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and strict liability. At the close of General Accident’s case, the trial court granted judgment in favor of Ford on the negligence, strict liability and express war- ranty claims, finding that there was no proof of negligent design.14 General Accident offered expert testi- mony that the fire had originated in the blower plenum, a box that includes a blower fan and associated electrical resis- tors which are part of the heating/air conditioning system. Its expert concluded that the design was defective because holes in the cowl vent (the area in front of the windshield that permits air to travel into the engine compartment) were too large and could have admitted debris such as leaves and other combustible material.15 The expert opined that such material could have come into contact with and been ignited by electrical resistors. Other causes were ruled out by General Accident’s expert.16
The trial court held
that General Accident did not meet its burden of proving the fire was caused by a design defect in the cowl vent.17
It fur-
ther granted judgment in favor of Ford as to all claims for breaches of implied war- ranties.18
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed
that portion of the trial court’s judgment in favor of Ford on the express warranty, negligence and strict liability claims, but reversed the trial court’s judgment with regard to implied warranty claims, urg- ing that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove a particular product defect in support of such claims. 19
In support of
its determination, the Court of Special 14
Id. at 327, 779 A.2d at 366. Ford’s truck came with an express “bumper to bumper” warranty that provided Ford would “replace, repair or adjust all parts on your
vehicle...that are defective in factory-supplied materials or workmanship for 3 years or 36,000 miles (whichever occurs first).” However, the “bumper to bumper” warranty excluded “al- teration, misuse, or damage caused by acci- dent” as well as consequential and incidental damages. Id. at 324, 779 A.2d at 364. 15Id. at 328, 779 A.2d at 366. 16Id.
17Id. at 329-30, 779 A.2d at 367. 18Id. at 329, 779 A.2d at 366-67.
19
Id. at 330-31, 779 A.2d at 367-68 (citing In- ternational Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 133 Md. App. 269, 276, 754 A.2d 1115,1118 (2000)).
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20Id. at 331, 779 A.2d at 368. 21
Id. 24
Appeals noted that the warranties, as statutorily defined, did not contain the words “defective condition” or “defect.”20 In concluding that General Accident did not have to prove a particular defect for purposes of the implied warranty of mer- chantability, the Court of Special Appeals reasoned: Ford manufactures chassis cabs
with knowledge that they will be modi- fied in some form or another. Ford was aware that Elzenheimer had, in the past, purchased Ford chassis cabs for the purpose of turning them into tow trucks. Thus, Ford impliedly war- ranted that the truck would be fit for usage as a tow truck. Here, the evidence showed that
Ford breached its implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when (1) General [Accident’s] insured was using the truck as a tow truck and (2) the truck unexpectedly caught on fire. The circuit court was persuaded that the fire started in the engine compart- ment of the truck while the truck was idling. The truck was being used “nor- mally” at that time, and trucks do not normally catch on fire while idling.21
The intermediate appellate court fur- ther determined that proof of a defect was not required for the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, again not- ing that the statute did not contain the words “defect” or “defective condition.”22 It found that Ford was aware that Elzenheimer had purchased Ford chassis cabs in the past for the purpose of turn- ing them into tow trucks and, as such, “Ford impliedly warranted that the truck would be fit for usage as a tow truck.”23 It concluded that implied warranties ex- ist to permit consumers to recover without having to prove the particular defect that caused the problem. 24
The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals also held that while post-sale modifications may constitute a valid de- fense to a claim of warranty, the burden was on Ford, the manufacturer, to prove
(Continued on page 6) 22
Id. at 332, 779 A.2d at 368 (citing Interna- tional Motors, 133 Md. App. at 276, 754 A.2d at 1118).
23
Id. at 332, 779 A.2d at 368 (citing Interna- tional Motors, 133 Md. App. at 276-277, 754 A.2d at 1119).
Id. (citing International Motors, 133 Md. App. at 277, 754 A.2d at 1119).
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