result of the event occurring is substantial (such as a successful terrorist attack on an airliner) then the Mathematical Expectation might be higher than a different event with a higher probability of occurrence but lesser consequences. So the low probability, high Mathematical Expectation event should receive more attention. Applying this to 9/11, while the probability of such an event was miniscule (as measured by the number of terrorist attackers, 19, as a fraction of the total number of passengers that had flown since the last serious attack - the PanAm 103 bombing), the quantifiable consequences in lost lives, lost airline revenue, damage to infrastructure, and slowing of the economy were in the hundreds of billions of dollars. This means that the Mathematical Expectation of a similarly severe attack is very high even though there’s only one terrorist in several billion travellers. Such an analytical strategy could be used not only to assess the value of a lane for processing elevated risk passengers (a High Security Lane) versus other security measures but also to assess how capable such a lane would need to be in order to effectively reduce the risk and consequences of an attack. Mathematical Expectation analysis could also be used to compare security measures across different threat vectors, with
a view to ensuring, for example, that the Mathematical Expectations for hold baggage screening, the checkpoint and cargo are roughly equivalent. This would ensure that we don’t focus on hardening one threat vector while leaving others wide open. To put risk reduction back into Risk Based
Screening, we need both good technology and an effective end-to-end screening process. This was the premise of the Checkpoint of the Future work. So what could we do to address the risk (which, as security professionals, is what we are supposed to do)? I recommend that:-
§ We reinstitute, along with a significant random component, the analysis of the passenger name record (PNR), similar to CAPPS, to use risk indicators to direct passengers to more intensive screening. This would provide a systematic method for identifying whether a passenger might be a “clean-skin” terrorist who would not otherwise have been selected (by not being on government watch-lists).
§ Each lane needs to be designed to counter the types of threats that each passenger category presents.
However
they’re unlikely to have attended Waziristan University and become experts in homemade explosives concealment in the way that elevated risk passengers might.
“
...trusted travellers are not zero risk...”
§ Serious attention needs to be placed on alternate configurations of high security lanes for elevated risk passengers for different types of airport operations. This will help us move towards real detection and away from assuming that today’s flawed technology configurations and procedures will find the types of materials and concealment methods that terrorists are likely to use against us. These efforts can occur in parallel with – and not necessarily impact - the rollout of trusted traveller programmes.
If we can embrace these, and potentially Trusted travellers are
not zero risk; they can still go insane and cause catastrophic damage.
other, measures, we can put risk reduction back into risk-based screening and improve our security in measurable and effective ways, rather than merely using it as a way to get passengers – unfortunately including terrorists – through security and on to aircraft more rapidly.
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August 2012 Aviationsecurityinternational
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www.asi-mag.com 4/2/2012 9:51:10 AM 5
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