The traditional complete IED is no longer the weapon of choice for the 21st Century terrorist intent on attacking the aviation system
than conceal a whole device in one object, the components of the IED are separated. Each item, when taken in isolation, would not normally arouse suspicions. Once in flight, the terrorist can assemble and initiate the device. This would, of course, result in the terrorist’s death but often that is exactly what they are seeking. Dispersal need not necessarily be a suicidal tactic. The Israeli carrier, El Al, has long had a high standard of security. In the 1980s, terrorists may have been able to get complete unaccompanied devices on to aircraft operated by Indian and American airlines at Canadian and British airports, but they knew the same
the eye is drawn away by the wires and circuit boards of the radio.
With
misrepresentation, the components can be seen but look like something else. They may be worked into the legitimate components of the concealing device, which may still work. For example the batteries of a radio could power the radio and the IED.
Both the Lockerbie and Air India devices passed through security in hold baggage without being detected. Screeners checked both bags and did not recognise the contents for what they really were. In the case of the Air India bombing, another IED also passed through security at the same time but it exploded while on the ground in Japan, killing a baggage handler. Aviation security techniques and
procedures have improved beyond recognition since then. We would hope that any such device being presented to security would be identified long before it reached an aircraft.
The
terrorists know this too. They are not stupid. So they sought, and continue to seek, other methods of getting an IED onto a flight.
One of these methods can be described as ‘dispersal’.
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would not be true of an Israeli flight. In 1986 an Irish woman, Anne Marie Murphy, was stopped and questioned as she attempted to check in for an El Al flight at London Heathrow. Unhappy with her answers, security staff searched her bag and found the main charge of a very viable IED concealed in the base of the bag. The only problem was that the explosives were not connected to any other component part. Screeners had, however, also found a calculator inside the bag and it was this item that contained a mini bomb – of insufficient size to cause the destruction of an airliner on its own, but placed above the larger quantity of explosives concealed beneath it, a potentially deadly combination. The bomb maker clearly believed that a large device in one object would be found but if it was separated into two parts it would not be. He was nearly right. Miss Murphy had no idea the device was there. Her Jordanian boyfriend, Nezar Hindawi, had persuaded her to travel to Israel, where he promised to join her later. He brought the bag to her house, complete with the main charge in situ. After she packed the
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bag, he placed the calculator at the base of the bag in close contact with the concealed main charge.
If
you’ve ever wondered why you’re asked about who packed your bag, that’s the reason.
The dispersal technique has been attempted several times since. In 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to initiate an IED while on board a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit.
His
attempt was not notable for its success and he has earned the unenviable sobriquet of the ‘underpants bomber’. The device failed to initiate correctly and later trials suggest the amount of explosives was insufficient to destroy the aircraft. This may result in our not taking the attempt seriously, but the intent was there and it does illustrate some key issues. His main charge of PETN was concealed in his underwear. His means of initiation was to inject acid from a syringe onto the PETN, causing a spontaneous reaction. There are two points of technical interest here. The first is that the device did not contain any metallic components - no batteries, wires, or switches – so it was able to pass through security. The other is that it was dispersed, with the main charge in Abdulmutallab’s groin area and the initiation system concealed elsewhere. The two were only brought together when Abdulmutallab intended to initiate the device.
Perhaps the best known attempt at dispersal was the 2006 ‘transatlantic’ or ‘liquid explosives’ plot. From a technical point of view, the thought that was applied to ways of defeating security was remarkable. The main charges were to be a liquid improvised explosive based on organic peroxides.
This was to
be contained within plastic ‘Oasis’ drinks bottles which had been emptied of their original contents using a syringe through the base, thus leaving the cap seals intact. The plotters went to some length to ensure that the liquid explosives would be the same colour as Oasis and, after much experimentation arrived at mixing the explosives with ‘Tang’ a proprietary drink. This was then to be injected through the base of the bottle. Once full, the needle hole at the base of the bottle would be sealed with glue. The result would look exactly like an unopened bottle of ‘Oasis’.
The initiation system was based August 2012 Aviationsecurityinternational
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